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I. INTRODUCTION
Five weeks after September 11, 2001, Congress adopted the USA
PATRIOT Act,' providing the executive branch with retrofitted tools to
investigate terrorism. 2 Recognizing that its decisions were hasty and that
the potency of the new tools was difficult to predict,3 Congress imposed
four year sunsets on sixteen of the more controversial provisions.' During
2005, Congress reconsidered those provisions and a few others and appeared
willing to renew them all with few amendments and many fewer sunsets.'
As this Article is being published, the House and the Senate are in the
throes of trying to reconcile their Patriot Act renewal bills, but the differ-
ences between the two versions, although bitterly disputed, are not substan-
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Hon. Gerald Bruce Lee, Paul Rosenzweig, and John Yoo for interesting conversations that
helped me to develop the ideas in this Article; Brandon Johnson and Robert Plunkett for
their excellent research assistance; and Brooklyn Law School for the continuing support of
its generous research stipend program.
IUSA PATRIOT Act is a labored acronym for the Act's full title: Uniting and Strengthen-
ing America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
2 The Patriot Act consists of hundreds of cryptic amendments to previous law, includ-
ing many provisions not relating to surveillance and some surveillance provisions not limited
to terrorism investigations. For a summary, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2002), available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf.
I For a fascinating insider account of Congress's decision-making process, see Beryl
A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1145 (2004).
4 See Patriot Act § 224(a) for a list of the Title II provisions without sunsets.
I See Eric Lichtblau, Congress Nears Deal to Renew Antiterror Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2005, at A01 (describing the draft conference report deemed likely to win approval);
Eric Lichtblau, Extension of Patriot Act Faces Threat of Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2005, at A26 (reporting that accord had not yet been reached). See infra text accompanying
notes 101-112, 147-151, 194, 220-222 for an explanation of the few areas where the
House or Senate renewal bills which were generated during the summer of 2005 proposed
amendments or sunsets. For a comparative summary of the provisions of the House and
Senate bills, see CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH., CDT ANALYSIS OF SENATE AND HOUSE
PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION BILLS (2005), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/
usapatriot/20050726patriotreauthorization.pdf.
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tial enough to dictate how history should characterize Congress's second
look at the Patriot Act.
The legislation resulting from the sunset hearings, whether it ultimately
favors the House or the Senate bill, can plausibly be described as failing
to reflect the concerns of a majority of the public about the wisdom of
conferring so much surveillance power on the executive branch. Several
of the provisions at issue-especially the tellingly nicknamed "library"
provision and "sneak and peek" authority-generated an extraordinary
level of public consternation and resistance. A grassroots movement, spear-
headed by the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, 6 led seven states and
399 cities, towns, and villages to adopt resolutions condemning various
Patriot Act provisions.7 These resolutions proclaimed the value of privacy,
freedom of speech, and freedom of religious and other associations, and
explicitly urged federal representatives to reexamine the Patriot Act criti-
cally.' Similar views about some of the Patriot Act provisions were reflected
among the public at large: almost three-quarters of Gallup poll respon-
dents in 2004 opposed the "sneak and peek" provision, 9 and approxi-
mately half opposed the "library" provision. 0 Although a majority of
those polled believed the Patriot Act as a whole did not go too far in re-
stricting civil liberties," the more respondents claimed to know about the
content of the Act, the more likely they were to oppose its provisions. 12
A majority of members of the House of Representatives agreed. Dur-
ing the year preceding the sunset hearings, the House had approved bills
to restrict the power conferred by each of those two contested provisions.
These limitations, however, were not included in the House Patriot Act
6 Bill of Rights Defense Committee Home Page, http://www.bordc.org (last visited
Oct. 14, 2005).
7 The states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, and Vermont. See
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Passing Statewide Civil Liberties Resolutions, http://
www.bordc.org/involved/states (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
8 See New York City, N.Y., Res. 60-2004 (Feb. 4, 2004), available at http://www.bordc.
org/detail.php?id=69, for a typical example of these provisions.
9 LYDIA SAAD, THE GALLUP ORG., AMERICANS GENERALLY COMFORTABLE WITH PA-
TRIOT ACT (2004), available at http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci = 10858. See
infra text accompanying note 210.
'0 SAAD, supra note 9. See infra text accompanying notes 84-92.
" When asked the question, "Based on what you have read or heard, do you think the
Patriot Act goes too far, is about right, or does not go far enough in restricting people's
civil liberties in order to fight terrorism?," 26% of those polled in 2004 said the Act went
too far, 21% thought it did not go far enough, while a 43% plurality believed it was "about
right." SAAD, supra note 9. In a 2005 follow up poll the question was modified, describing
the government's goal at the end of the sentence as "to investigate suspected terrorism"
instead of "to fight terrorism," and the numbers shifted slightly: 30% thought the Act went
"too far," 21% "not far enough," and 43% rated it "about right." DARREN K. CARLSON, THE
GALLUP ORG., LIBERTY VS. SECURITY: PUBLIC MIXED ON PATRIOT ACT (2005), available
at http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci = 17392.
12 In the 2005 poll, 45% of respondents describing themselves as very familiar with the
Act believed it goes too far in restricting civil liberties, and 33% of those who claimed to
be somewhat familiar with its provisions held that same opinion, adding up to more than
double the disapproval rate of the public as a whole. CARLSON, supra note 11.
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renewal bill'3 because procedural maneuvering prevented them from reach-
ing a vote on the floor.'4 The Senate, sheltered by its politically insulated
structure, was more willing to revise the provisions engaged citizens were
questioning 5 and was considerably more dignified in its proceedings. 6
Partisan politics is only one reason why the final Patriot Act legisla-
tion may not accurately reflect the views of a majority of the public. Both
public opinion and the legislative process have been distorted by widespread
misunderstanding of the Patriot Act powers themselves, misapprehension
of the procedural questions actually being debated, and the dense cloud of
secrecy surrounding implementation of these powers."' "Patriot Act" often
seems like a trope-words conveying a symbolic meaning, in this case en-
gaging a set of political attitudes, rather than a literal reference to a piece
of legislation.
But even if a majority of Americans would, if fully informed, support
most or even all of a renewed Patriot Act, what Congress decides should not
be the final word on whether executive branch surveillance powers are rea-
sonable. 8 The controversial Patriot Act provisions implicate rights we
generally expect the judiciary, not Congress, to protect against popular
opinion: freedoms of speech, association, and exercise of religion, and ex-
pectations of privacy. Among those expressing greatest concern about the
enhanced government surveillance powers are politically underrepresented
minorities, particularly Arab and Muslim men, who fear that most Ameri-
13 See infra text accompanying notes 107-108.
14 For an account by dissenting Democrats of the amendments proposed and how they
were treated, see DISSENTING VIEWS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3199, THE "USA PATRIOT AND
INTELLIGENCE REFORM REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005" (2005), available at http://www.
house.gov/judiciary-democrats/demviews/hr3 I 99patriotdissent 1 09.pdf.
"5 See infra text accompanying notes 101-106, 147.
16 In a praiseworthy attempt to rise above partisan politics and avoid legislative impasse,
the Senate Judiciary Committee crafted a bipartisan compromise bill, which the Senate
unanimously approved. See infra text accompanying note 106.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 90-92.
18 It is not my purpose in this Article to mount an argument against the Patriot Act pro-
visions I explore, but to discuss the relative roles of Congress and the judiciary in evaluat-
ing arguments that those provisions go too far in restricting rights. Such arguments have
been elaborated elsewhere, including by me. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING
THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICA SAFE AND FREE (2005) (arguing that although some
Patriot Act provisions are essential and do provide protections for civil liberties, some of
the powers conferred are too broad and insufficiently attentive to interests of transparency
and accountability); ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, ACLU, UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: THE
POWER OF THE FBI TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS
WITHOUT TELLING YOU (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.
cfm?lD=13246&c-207; NANCY CHANG, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE USA
PATRIOT ACT: WHAT'S So PATRIOTIC ABOUT TRAMPLING THE BILL OF RIGHTS? (2001),
available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/docs/USAPATRIOTACT.pdf; John W. White-
head & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A
Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOTAct and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism
Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088-90 (2002); Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot
Act and the US Department of Justice: Losing Our Balances?, JURIST, Dec. 3, 2001,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew40.htm (arguing that the Patriot Act destroys es-
sential checks and balances).
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cans may be overly willing to sacrifice someone else's rights for their own
sense of security.9
Justice Stone's venerable Carolene Products Footnote 4 framework
20
suggests that the courts have a special role to play in reviewing legislation
affecting discrete and insular minorities or infringing a specific protec-
tion of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence generates an expectation that the Constitution will offer a cure
if Congress has gone "too far" in pruning rights. The Supreme Court, from
the Warren through the Rehnquist eras, has been willing to provide a coun-
termajoritarian 2 check by finding an act of Congress to violate the First
Amendment even if a majority of the public supports that act.22 The Court
certainly has power under the Fourth Amendment 3 to invalidate an act of
Congress permitting unconstrained executive branch surveillance that a
majority of the public finds unreasonable, and even an act a majority ap-
proves. But although it could do so either as part of its mission to protect
rights or under some form of representation-reinforcement theory,2 4 the
Court has been increasingly reluctant to interpret the Fourth Amendment
as providing judicial constraints on government surveillance.2 5 It is too soon
to tell whether the Court will use its authority to modify Patriot Act pro-
visions that impinge upon First Amendment values. It is not too soon to
predict that the current Court is unlikely to interpret the Fourth Amendment,
a pariah among constitutional rights, as providing any significant check on
whatever surveillance powers Congress ultimately decides to afford the ex-
ecutive branch.
A central complaint about the Patriot Act provisions in question is
that they do not always leave room for the courts to play their historic
role in antecedent review of executive branch surveillance activities. 26 Ironi-
cally, the courts are also unlikely to play a major role in deciding whether
this ever-increasing shift of authority from the judiciary to the executive
19 See infra text accompanying notes 320-324.
20 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
21 1 use this word to describe judicial willingness to find that the Constitution some-
times constrains the choices of political majorities.
22 See infra note 247 for examples.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.")
24 See infra text accompanying notes 320-323.
25 See infra notes 240-245 and accompanying text.
26 Although I am focusing on Patriot Act provisions, I do not think that the Patriot
Act's incremental changes should be viewed in isolation. The Patriot Act follows years of
other legislation expanding the government's surveillance authority, like the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, passed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255
(2000), and adding 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (2000)). The baseline that the Patriot Act moved,
even if only slightly in some areas, was already a fair distance from Fourth Amendment pre-
cepts.
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branch is constitutional. Fourth Amendment challenges to the Patriot Act
have proved stubbornly resistant to litigation. In the four years since the en-
actment of the Patriot Act, very few challengers have even attempted to liti-
gate the constitutionality of any of the provisions discussed here. The
course of litigation has been profoundly affected by the very nature of the
legislation at issue. Because of the heightened secrecy surrounding the im-
plementation of Patriot Act surveillance powers, targets do not know that
they have been the subject of surveillance and custodians of records are
not permitted to share that information.27 Thus, there are few people who
have both the necessary knowledge and the will to litigate. Custodians, if
they have actually been asked to turn over records, do have standing to
raise a narrow set of constitutional claims, but most have little desire or
incentive to litigate against the government.28 The automatic gag orders
attached to several Patriot Act provisions threaten custodians with crimi-
nal prosecution for revealing to anyone (ostensibly even counsel or a court)
that they have been asked to turn over records.29 Although the govern-
ment has formally demanded records from custodians tens of thousands
of times under Patriot Act authority,30 only two custodians, so far as the
public knows, have gone to court to challenge those requests.3
There is a second and more critical reason why the role of the courts
has been minimized. Fourth Amendment doctrine itself has created the
loopholes within which the Patriot Act operates. Since the end of the Warren
Court era, the Supreme Court has paid little more than lip service to Fourth
Amendment precepts, generating myriad exceptions and exclusions to
what the Fourth Amendment might otherwise require.32 Unlike the coun-
termajoritarian First Amendment doctrine, Fourth Amendment doctrine
currently seems to be submajoritarian: that is, it appears to allow the gov-
ernment discretion to conduct surveillance that a majority of people would
find unreasonable.33 In our judiciocentric culture, if the courts find a gov-
ernment surveillance power constitutional, most observers will assume that
27 Targets would presumably be notified if they were prosecuted on the basis of infor-
mation obtained and could then bring a motion to suppress evidence derived from any alleg-
edly unconstitutional surveillance. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
28 Many custodians agree to provide requested information even in the absence of a
court order. See Audrey Hudson, Librarians Dispute Justice's Claim on Use of Patriot Act,
WASH. TtMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at AI0. See infra text accompanying notes 128-141.
29 See infra text accompanying notes 54-57, 118-119. This secrecy incidentally shields
custodians from any public or personal opprobrium their compliance might generate.30 See infra note 122.
3' See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Doe v. Gonzales, No.
3:05-1256 (D. Conn. filed Aug. 9, 2005). These cases are discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 128-141.
32 There are certainly exceptions to this generalization, individual cases where the Su-
preme Court has shown a commitment to some Fourth Amendment principle. But the over-
all trend is clear. In the four years since September 11, for example, the Court has ruled
against Fourth Amendment claims in thirteen of the fourteen cases it reviewed. See infra
text accompanying notes 374-377.
33 See infra Part III.
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the power is ipso facto reasonable. When I have spoken about the Patriot
Act to groups of lawyers, judges, students, and community groups, a com-
mon response from those who express concern about the breadth and un-
reviewability of the government's investigatory powers is to inquire whether
the courts have found the controversial provisions unconstitutional. Ob-
servers, both lawyers and non-lawyers, seem inclined to conclude that if
the courts are not striking down these provisions, their own concerns must
be unfounded.34
Acting against a fairly blank constitutional canvas, Congress may actu-
ally have provided more protection of individual privacy in some Patriot
Act provisions than the Supreme Court would find the Constitution to re-
quire, even if Congress's conclusions are themselves submajoritarian. This is
not consistent with our expectation about how constitutional ratchets are
supposed to work, but it is consistent with the role Congress has found itself
playing with respect to government surveillance throughout much of the
twentieth century. The Supreme Court, for a confluence of reasons,35 has
often interpreted the Fourth Amendment as allowing executive branch sur-
veillance without any check. Congress then responded to some of the
Court's decisions by providing statutory procedural constraints so that sur-
veillance power would not exceed what a majority of the public was ac-
tually willing to countenance.3
6
My concern is that the role of the courts in this area has been so mini-
mized-both in antecedent review of the reasonableness of executive branch
surveillance decisions and in review of the constitutionality of legislative
decisions delegating discretion to the executive branch-that one-third of
the Constitution's design of checks and balances is all but missing. The
purpose of this Article is to discuss the Patriot Act as an example of this
radical shift of power and to consider possibilities for restoring the role
of the courts. Part II of this Article describes four controversial Patriot
Act provisions, the few stunted attempts to litigate their constitutionality,
and the development of public and legislative reactions throughout the
past four years. Part III recounts how the Supreme Court created some of
the loopholes the Patriot Act exploits, by deciding, for example, that
some government conduct (like commandeering business records) does
not raise any Fourth Amendment concerns, and contrasts Congress's re-
actions to those decisions. Part IV discusses how and why the Fourth
Amendment should be renovated to provide a credible judicial check on
14 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Con-
stitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1220 (1978) ("[A]s a general matter, the scope
of a constitutional norm is considered to be coterminous with the scope of its judicial en-
forcement."); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MIcH. L. REV. 904, 919-
21 (2004) (describing the inclination of Americans to defer to the Court's view because of
the perceived moral and political authority of constitutional doctrine).
31 These include profound ambivalence about the exclusionary rule. See infra text ac-
companying notes 250-256.
36 See infra text accompanying notes 266-267, 279, 290-292.
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executive and legislative branch decisions about when surveillance is rea-
sonable.
The Supreme Court has had a notoriously difficult time making sense
of the Fourth Amendment. Instead of undertaking to define the values the
Fourth Amendment protects, the Court has adopted a general posture of
deference to the elected branches. The Court's reluctance to make possi-
bly countermajoritarian normative choices about values of privacy (espe-
cially as balanced against claims of security) is unlikely to end any time
soon. Therefore, if the Fourth Amendment is to have any meaning, the an-
swer must lie in a positivist approach. The Court would do well to attend
to representation-reinforcement theory and recognize that whether a search
is unreasonable is not always a matter of simply balancing liberty and secu-
rity. Instead of deferring to ad hoc executive branch decisions about what
is reasonable, the Court might adopt a version of the positivist hybrid
rights theory it has used in other areas of constitutional interpretation-
such as procedural due process and recent death penalty cases 37-to avoid
making its own normative choices. As in those cases, the Court could
look to legislation and other objective reflections of the privacy values
society is actually willing to protect. Whatever conclusions this inquiry
yields, the Court must then insist on the prerogative of the judiciary to
decide what procedures are appropriate to protect those values.
Even if Congress is accurately representing the views of a majority,
the Patriot Act, standing on the shoulders of earlier permissive statutes
and judicial decisions, moves far enough from Fourth Amendment core
principles that it begs for meaningful review by the judiciary. If Congress
has missed the majoritarian mark in some spots, there is even more rea-
son for the Court to provide a constitutional check. The greatest problem
with the Patriot Act may not be that it is unconstitutional, as some argue,
but that, in too many respects, it is not. Even more than the Patriot Act,
Fourth Amendment doctrine needs reconsideration.
II. THE PATRIOT ACT IN ACTION
This Part's discussion of four of the most controversial surveillance
provisions of the Patriot Act will show the roles that Congress, the execu-
tive branch, and the courts have played in deciding what level of surveil-
lance is reasonable. Secrecy and executive branch control over the flow
of information have undermined both political and judicial accountability.
The four selected provisions have provoked the greatest controversy
in the public, the courts, and the legislature. Section 215, made famous by
indignant librarians, allows the government to obtain a court order pro-
viding access to tangible things and records on the basis of a certification by
executive branch officials (rather than a judicial determination) and or-
17 See infra text accompanying notes 355-356.
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ders the recipient not to tell anyone about the government's request.38
Section 505 permits the government to issue National Security Letters to
obtain customer records from Internet service providers and other custo-
dians without even the perfunctory court order required by section 215,
and under an even broader gag order.39 Section 218 expands authority for
surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).4
Finally, section 213, the so-called "sneak and peek" authority, allows agents
executing search warrants to delay telling the targets that their property
has been searched or even seized.4 1 These four provisions exemplify sev-
eral different ways in which Congress has allowed the executive branch
to deviate from the presumptive Fourth Amendment model requiring:
(1) some form of individualized suspicion (presumptively probable cause),
(2) antecedent judicial review where feasible,42 and (3) notice of any search
or seizure.43 Sections 215 and 505 do not require the executive branch to
obtain a warrant based on individualized suspicion." Section 218 does re-
quire a court order to authorize electronic surveillance, but the requisite
probable cause finding, the rule governing notice, and even the nature of
the court itself diverge from the Fourth Amendment model. Section 213
creates an exception to the prototypical Fourth Amendment requirement
of prompt notice to the target of a search or seizure.
The first Section describes how each of these provisions changed previ-
ous law and what critics have faulted. Each provision entails: (a) an en-
hancement of executive discretion about when to conduct surveillance,
(b) an expansion of executive discretion to decide whether and when to di-
vulge information about its own surveillance activities, (c) a minimization of
38 See infra text accompanying notes 45-54 for a description of how this section
changed previous law.
39 See infra Part II.B.1.
40 See infra Part II.C. 1.
41 A court's permission is required in order to defer notice. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 196-200. Other surveillance powers expanded by the Patriot Act also have been
the subject of criticism for increasing governmental discretion, minimizing judicial over-
sight, and creating a more opaque veil of secrecy. See, e.g., Peter G. Madrifian, Devil in the
Details: Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Internet Surveillance Provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 783 (2003) (critiquing section 206 roving
wiretap authority); Rachel S. Martin, Watch What You Type: As the FBI Records Your Key-
strokes, the Fourth Amendment Develops Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1271 (2003) (critiquing section 216 authority to collect any dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information under the procedures governing acquisition of telephone numbers);
Steven A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn't
Dead, But No One Will Insure It, 54 FLA. L. REV. 521 (2002) (criticizing the scope of sec-
tion 216).
42 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The Court has carved out innumer-
able exceptions, but this is said to be the default rule.
41 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding that a search was un-
constitutional when the authorizing warrant did not prescribe in its terms the scope of the
search, even though supporting documents provided that information).
44 Congress may well have assumed that the conduct authorized in those sections does
not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See infra Part
III.B.1.c.
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the judicial role in approving surveillance before the fact, and (d) a surpris-
ing minimization of the judicial role in reviewing the constitutionality of
this channeling of discretion.
The second Section discusses what the public has and has not been
told about the implementation of each section's authority and recounts the
fate of attempts to litigate the section's constitutionality. These discussions
will show how the executive branch has controlled the flow of informa-
tion to shape public opinion (by deciding whether and when to dissemi-
nate information), to prevent litigation challenging the use of the powers
conferred, and to disrupt the course of the few lawsuits that have been
brought. The account of the one or two cases apiece concerning three of the
four provisions will explain why the courts have thus far played such a
small role in judging the constitutionality of the provisions in question.
The final Section describes the public and legislative reactions to
each section over the past four years, providing a basis for assessing how
Congress used its opportunity to reconsider these provisions.
A. Section 215: Librarians and Beyond
1. Contents and Critique
Section 215, titled "Access to Records and Other Items Under the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act,"45 authorizes the government to acquire
45 Because the provision has been so widely mischaracterized, it is worth setting out
the relevant text:
(a)(l) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a designee of the Di-
rector (whose rank shall be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may
make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investiga-
tion to ... protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence ac-
tivities, provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitu-
tion ....
(b) ... Each application under this section ...
(2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investiga-
tion conducted in accordance with subsection (a)(2) of this section to obtain for-
eign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, the judge shall enter an
ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the release of records if the
judge finds that the application meets the requirements of this section ....
(d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons neces-
sary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.
Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861
(Supp. II 2002)).
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records and tangible things from custodians-including educational or
financial institutions, Internet service providers, or even indignant librari-
ans-under a court order.46 The predecessor to this section, enacted after
the Oklahoma City and 1993 World Trade Center bombings, allowed the
government to obtain travel records47 under the relatively permissive pro-
cedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") 48 on the
basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person
to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.49
The Patriot Act vastly expanded the kinds of records and objects the gov-
ernment could acquire under this provision, which now covers any type of
record and tangible thing, and eliminated the requirement that the gov-
ernment demonstrate any form of individualized suspicion. FISA's predi-
cate showing that the target is an agent of a foreign power is at least a fac-
simile of the probable cause requirement if not the genuine article, pro-
viding an opportunity for a reviewing court to determine whether there is
some convincing reason for the government to single out a target other than
a foreign power.5 ° Instead, section 215 only requires that the affiant, a
highly placed designee of the Director of the FBI, 5' certify that he or she
believes that information relevant to an investigation against "international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities" may be obtained.52 Once the
affiant has done this, the court "shall" enter an ex parte order, "as re-
quested, or as modified, approving the release of records. 53
Section 215 contains a broad gag order that prohibits any person from
disclosing to anyone "other than those persons necessary to produce the
tangible things" that the FBI has sought or obtained tangible things under
this section.5 4 Other than this narrow pragmatic exception, there is no
46 The order may require "the production of any tangible things (including books, re-
cords, papers, documents, and other items) ...." Id. § 1861 (a)(1).
47 Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1306, 1331 n.166 (2004).
48 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000). FISA's procedural requirements are less rigorous
than those imposed in criminal investigations. See infra text accompanying notes 306-308.
49 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B) (2000) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) (Supp.
II 2002)).
50 This predicate substitutes for the showing that would be required in a criminal inves-
tigation: probable cause to believe the target is committing or has committed a crime.
1' The designee must be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002). This provision treats the involvement of higher executive
officials as a sufficient safeguard against abuse, a political alternative to meaningful judi-
cial review and oversight.52 1d. § 1861(b)(2).
53 Id. § 186 1(c)(1). The person whose records are sought therefore need not be a sus-
pect at all, but merely a potential source of information. It is unclear how much authority
or independence the court could claim due to its statutory power to "modify" the order the
government seeks. The statute does not invite a court to decline the government's applica-
tion. Of course, modification power exercised strenuously can be tantamount to a refusal.
Because the FISA court operates in secrecy, the public cannot learn how broadly this modifi-
cation power is used.
14 One sign of the haste with which the Patriot Act was enacted is that not all provi-
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boundary or time limit to the nondisclosure provision. Not only is the custo-
dian never to tell the target that his or her records have been requested or
turned over, but the statute contains no exception allowing custodians to
consult counsel, to ask a court to lift the prohibition, or to report to the In-
spector General or the press that the government has made such a request,
even if they do not reveal the name of the target or the nature of the in-
formation requested.
The chief criticisms leveled against this provision target each feature
described above. First, the provision allegedly violates Fourth Amendment
principles of antecedent review by not requiring a court to find individu-
alized suspicion before issuing the order." The government may gather
sensitive information, including medical, religious, or library records, about
anyone even if there is no reason to suspect the person whose records are
sought of any sort of misconduct or connection with terrorists. Because
there is no requirement of any form of individualized suspicion, the court
issuing the order has less to decide and less of a role than a court issuing
a traditional search warrant (where the court would evaluate the existence
of probable cause to believe the individual is involved in criminal activ-
ity).5 6 Second, the gag order allegedly violates the Fourth Amendment be-
cause-unlike searches pursuant to a warrant or electronic surveillance in
criminal investigations 57-it does not provide for notice to the target, even
after the fact. Because the target never learns of the issuance of the order
(unless and until a criminal prosecution is brought), the potential safe-
guard of giving the target an opportunity to invoke judicial review of any
sort is eliminated.
First Amendment concerns are also raised about this section, as it al-
lows the gathering of information about an individual's reading habits,
sions which are comparable to section 215 have their own gag orders, and the relationship
of these provisions to section 215 is unclear. Section 507, for example, provides a proce-
dure, comparable to that of section 215, for requiring educational institutions to turn over
records that would have remained private under previous law. Section 507 appears to create
its own procedure authorizing such court orders but does not mention nondisclosure. As a
result, it is unclear whether a gag order applies to court orders under section 507, or whether
the government can elect to acquire educational records under section 215 and thus shelter
its request under that provision's gag order. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 507, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(j) (Supp. II 2002)).
55 See, e.g., ACLU, Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT Act, http://www.aclu.org/
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?lD= 12263&c=206 (last visited Oct. 14, 2005); ACLU, Section
215 FAQ, http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfmID= I 1054&c= 130. But see USA PATRI-
OT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, S. 1389, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005).
56 Even a court issuing a FISA surveillance order would be evaluating whether there is
probable cause to believe the target is an agent of a foreign power or involved with interna-
tional terrorism. See infra notes 154, 306 and accompanying text.
17 Electronic surveillance in criminal investigations is conducted under the procedures
set out in Title III, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(2000), which include showings of probable cause, judicial supervision, time limits, and
provision of notice at the termination of the surveillance. For a concise summary of Title
III, see Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Elec-
tronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983).
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Internet activities, or religious practices. 8 Even if the discretion to inves-
tigate is not actually used in such a manner, the specter of such use might
chill people from engaging in lawful and valued forms of speech and as-
sociation, like taking books out of a library or attending a mosque. In a nod
to First Amendment values, Congress had provided in FISA that "United
States persons" may not be subjected to FISA surveillance "solely upon
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment . . . ."I Section 215
did not rescind this prohibition, but the protection is of limited value. United
States persons may still be investigated based in part on First Amendment
protected activities (including protected speech or association), non-United
States persons may be investigated "solely" on the basis of their speech
or association, and the gag order makes it impossible for targets to chal-
lenge politically or religiously motivated investigations because they will
not know that such investigations are taking place.60
The government, on the other hand, can plausibly argue that section
215 actually provides more process than is constitutionally necessary. The
Supreme Court has held that targets have no Fourth Amendment rights with
respect to governmental demands for business records held by a third party
because such a demand does not count as a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.6' If the Fourth Amendment does not apply, no
prior judicial approval or showing of individualized suspicion is required.
Thus, even if Congress leaves the section unamended, it will have ex-
ceeded the constitutional mark.6 2
2. Implementation and Litigation of Section 215
The statute's gag order, combined with the Department of Justice's
desire to keep its investigations of records secret, meant that for the first
few years after the Act went into effect, the public knew nothing about
the implementation of this provision. Ultimately, public opinion rather
than court order led to some disclosure. In a Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") lawsuit asking for information about the frequency with which
the section 215 authority had been used, the district court accepted the
58 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 18, at 1096-97 (arguing that anti-terrorism legis-
lation has had a "deleterious effect" on free speech).
19 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(3)(A) (2000).
60 1 assume there is a loss of privacy when secret searches occur, but not everyone agrees.
See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig, Privacy and Consequences: Legal and Policy Structures for
Implementing New Counter-Terrorism Technologies and Protecting Civil Liberty, in EMER-
GENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND ENABLING POLICIES FOR COUNTER TERRORISM
(Robert L. Popp & John Yen eds.) (forthcoming 2006) (questioning the extent to which privacy
interests are actually compromised if the individual being searched is unaware of the
search).
61 See infra text accompanying notes 275-292.
62 There are serious questions about whether one can distinguish business records in-
volving new technologies, including the Internet, under these precedents or in areas where
First Amendment interests overlap with privacy concerns. See infra note 325.
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government's argument that even this statistical information was exempt
from disclosure because, although the public clearly had an interest in
such information, it could compromise national security to reveal even how
frequently the power was used.63 On September 18, 2003, in response to
growing public concern about the breadth of this section (particularly its
potential use in the context of libraries), Attorney General Ashcroft "de-
classified" information about the use of section 215 and announced that
the authority under this section had not been used at all between the pas-
sage of the Patriot Act and that date. 64 What happened after September
2003 was an open question65 until Attorney General Gonzales announced
in April 2005 that section 215 authority had been used on thirty-five oc-
casions, but never with respect to libraries or bookstores.
66
Figures about the use of section 215 do not provide an accurate gauge
of how frequently the government has sought records from libraries or
other custodians of records. First, section 505 of the Patriot Act provides
an avenue for government requisition of some kinds of records from li-
braries and other service providers without even a court order.67 In addi-
tion, if custodians voluntarily turn over requested records, no court order
is necessary and so instances of cooperation will not become section 215
statistics. In a survey of librarians one year after enactment of the Patriot
Act, 219 respondents said that their staffs had voluntarily supplied re-
cords while 225 reported that they had not voluntarily complied.68
Section 215 has proved impervious to litigation. Because of the gag
order, targets are unlikely to know if the government has actually acquired
their records from a custodian unless and until the government wishes to
use evidence derived from those records in a criminal prosecution. If the
government discloses that evidence was obtained under an arguably un-
63 ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2003). The court
commented that the House Judiciary Committee, in its oversight capacity, asked to receive
accounts of how frequently section 215 orders were granted, denied, or modified, and noted
the Department of Justice's reluctance to provide this information even to the Committee.
Id. at 24-25..
64 Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Not Used New Library Records Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2003, at A20.
65 See Amy Goldstein, Patriot Act Provision Invoked, Memo Says, WASH. POST, June
18, 2004, at AI I ("The FBI asked the Justice Department last fall to seek permission from
a secret federal court to use the most controversial provision of the USA Patriot Act, four
weeks after Attorney General John D. Ashcroft said that part of the law had never been
used .... ").
In a subsequent round of FOIA litigation, the ACLU argued that Attorney General
Ashcroft's 2003 announcement demonstrated that such information could be released without
compromising national security, but the court adhered to its earlier exemption ruling.
ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2004).
66 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PATRIOT ACT PROVISIONS SET FOR REAUTHORI-
ZATION (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/April/05-opa_ I 63.htm.
67 See infra text accompanying notes 114-118.
68 LEIGH S. EASTABROOK, PUBLIC LIBRARIES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A PROFESSION DI-
VIDED (2002), available at http://alexia.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/civil-liberties.html.
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constitutional provision, 69 a criminal defendant could bring a motion to
suppress evidence on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained.
The constitutionality of section 215 has not yet been litigated by anyone
whose records were obtained under the authority of this section.7" Indeed,
the timing of criminal litigation is within the control of the government,
which can decide whether or not to prosecute, whether or not to rely on
evidence a defendant might challenge, and whether or not to enter a plea
bargain in order to avoid a judicial decision on a defendant's motion to
suppress evidence.7
Despite the paucity of public information about implementation, a
number of Arab and Muslim groups in Detroit, Michigan, brought a con-
stitutional challenge to section 215 in Muslim Community Association of
Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft ("MCA").7" The plaintiffs asserted that they had a
"well-founded belief that they and their members, clients and constituents
... have been or are currently the targets of investigations conducted un-
der Section 215."' 1 One of the plaintiffs, an Islamic Center, contended that it
was likely to be asked to provide records of its members and, due to the
gag order, would be unable to challenge the constitutionality of such an or-
der.74 Some of the plaintiffs also alleged that concern about the potential
use of this Patriot Act power was causing community members to be "afraid
to attend a mosque, practice their religion, or express their opinions about
religious and political issues."" This type of harm may be suffered even by
69 Several magistrate judges have privately expressed to me their concern that the gov-
ernment may not always reveal in an affidavit for a later search warrant that evidence obtained
under controversial statutory authorization provided a basis for their further investigations.
70 In United States v. Battle, No. 02-399-JO, 2003 WL 751155 (D. Or. Feb. 25, 2003),
the government brought a criminal prosecution against United States citizens for, inter alia,
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. On learning that FISA wiretaps and physi-
cal searches had been conducted against them for a period of two months, the defendants
filed a motion to suppress the FISA-derived evidence on the ground that it was unconstitu-
tionally obtained. Defendant's Memorandum at 41 n.21, Battle, No. 02-399-JO (D. Or. Feb.
25, 2003), 2003 WL 751155; Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Suppress Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Evidence at 1, 9-10, Battle, No. 02-399-JO (D.
Or. Feb. 25, 2003), 2003 WL 751155. The defendants pleaded guilty before the motion to
suppress was decided, however, so the constitutional issue was not resolved. Janine Rob-
ben, Last Portland 7 Plea Deals Give Some Solace to the Guilty, PORTLAND TRIB., Oct. 21,
2003, available at http://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=20990.
7' See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868-69, 884 (2004) (commenting
on hurdles to Fourth Amendment litigation generally, including the Department of Justice's
ability to control the timing and content of criminal prosecutions).
72 No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
71 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann
Arbor, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.
cfm?id= 13247. Other plaintiffs included the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit-
tee, the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, the Bridge Refugee &
Sponsorship Services, the Council on American-Islam Relations, the Islamic Center of
Portland, and Masjed As-Saber.
74 Id. 149-151.
75 Id. 152.
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those who do not know whether the government is screening their records.
The First Amendment chilling effect claim, unlike the Fourth Amendment
claims, is not contingent on whether the power in question has actually
been used.
The government moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
section 215 and that their claim was not ripe because they could not show
that section 215 had actually been used with respect to them or, indeed,
at that point, with respect to anyone.7 6 The secrecy surrounding the use or
non-use of section 215 proved a major impediment to the resolution of the
case. The government's motion to dismiss, filed on October 3, 2003, still
has not been decided more than two years later." The plaintiffs noted that
the government's disclaimer about the use of section 215 only covered
the period of time prior to September 18, 2003, and suggested that the gov-
ernment might have used the section 215 authority subsequent to that date.78
In response, the government submitted an ex parte declaration to the
court, on the issue of the "use or non-use" of the section 215 powers. On
August 19, 2004, the plaintiffs moved to exclude the ex parte declaration as
unfair,79 a motion the court denied on April 13, 2005.80 Some of the facts
on which the court's evaluation of standing and ripeness may be based,
therefore, were not disclosed to the plaintiffs, creating a distortion in the
adversary process.
The MCA case also suggests, as another case has shown,8' that the cus-
todians of records, ironically, may be in a better position to claim constitu-
tional rights than the targets whose privacy is actually at issue. At least
one of the plaintiffs in the MCA case, as a custodian of records, has a dis-
crete Fourth Amendment right to seek judicial review before being com-
pelled to submit to a seizure of things in its possession.82 If a custodian
can overcome the hurdles of establishing standing and ripeness, this argu-
76 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann Arbor, No. 03-72913
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
71 See Docket Report, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann Arbor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
78 For the government's September 2003 disclaimer, see Lichtblau, supra note 64.
79 Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Ex Parte Portions of the Supplemental Baker Declara-
tion, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann Arbor, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Defendants'
Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Letter of May 19 at 1, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of
Ann Arbor, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
60 The denial was without prejudice to renewal. Order, Muslim Cmty. Ass'n of Ann
Arbor v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
81 See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 128-138).
82 See id. at 494-95. Section 215 is distinguishable from section 505, the subject of the
Doe case, because there is a court order involved in the former. The antecedent approval
process, however, is ex parte, and the custodian should still be afforded an.opportunity to con-
test the reasonableness of the order, even if the standard the courts apply to evaluate a
custodian's complaint is not very demanding. See id. at 495.
82 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 41
ment seems to have a greater likelihood of success than the Fourth Amend-
ment claims of targets and potential targets.
The MCA case shows how profound an impact secrecy can have on
constitutional litigation. Because of the secrecy surrounding the implemen-
tation of section 215, targets could not join the litigation, custodians had
difficulty establishing both standing and ripeness, critical aspects of the
litigation took place ex parte and in camera, and the plaintiffs' attorney was
at a disadvantage without equal access to the facts on which arguments
could be based. Because the Attorney General could decide whether and
when to divulge information about the implementation of section 215,
one party-the government-gained a considerable measure of control
over multiple aspects of the litigation. 3
3. Public and Legislative Reaction
Approximately half the public and half the members of the House of
Representatives have expressed grave reservations about the power con-
ferred by section 215. Fifty-one percent of respondents in a 2004 Gallup
Poll disapproved of "requiring businesses, including hospitals, bookstores,
and libraries, to turn over records in terrorism investigations without in-
forming their patients or clients. 8 4 The American Library Association has
been highly critical of the potential use of this power in libraries and has
actively lobbied for modifications. 5 Some librarians decided to shred
their records in order to avoid the prospect of being required to turn them
over, while others have posted notices warning patrons that their records
might be subject to scrutiny.8 6 Communities have responded by introduc-
ing resolutions supporting their librarians.8 7 A coalition of liberals and con-
83 The executive branch also decides whether to grant court personnel, including a judge's
law clerks and other aides, security clearances that are required for access to classified infor-
mation. See Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025
(1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
"4 SAAD, supra note 9.
" Press Release, Am. Library Ass'n, In Wake of Declassified Report, ALA Renews
Call for Legislative Amendments to PATRIOT Act (Sept. 18, 2003), available at http://
www.ala.org/alalpressreleasesbucket/pressreleases2003 sep/alarenewscall.htm.
86 See Am. Library Ass'n, Resolution on the USA Patriot Act and Related Measures
that Infringe on the Rights of Library Users (Jan. 29, 2003), available at http://www.ala.
org/ala/oif/statementspols/ifresolutions/usapatriotactresolution.pdf ("[T]he American Li-
brary Association urges librarians everywhere to defend and support user privacy and free
and open access to knowledge and information."); see also Rene Sanchez, Librarians Make
Some Noise Over Patriot Act, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2003, at A20 (describing a "backlash"
against provisions in the Patriot Act where "[a]long with posting warnings about the law,
some libraries are rushing to destroy nearly all of the records they keep of what their pa-
trons read, as well as sign-up logs of computer use").
87 See Joint Resolution Strongly Urging the President to Revise Executive Orders and
Policies, and for Congress to Amend Provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act [sic], Which Seri-
ously Erode Fundamental Civil Liberties, H.R.J. Res. 203, 2003-04 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2003),
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2004/ournalUHJ030220.htm (resolving that "the
General Assembly requests that the office of the Vermont Attorney General offer legal
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servatives concerned about the breadth of Patriot Act powers targeted section
215 as one of three provisions on which to focus its lobbying efforts during
the renewal hearings."s Commentators have also been highly critical of
this section.t 9
Public reactions are of course colored by the abundant misinformation
surrounding this provision. The public may have underestimated how exten-
sive the section 215 power is because Department of Justice spokespersons
erroneously announced that such records could only be obtained on the
basis of probable cause9" and that the provision does not apply to citizens.9'
The public may not have understood that the actual issues Congress was
debating were narrow and procedural: not whether the government may
ever acquire library records, but what judicial review is necessary before
the government may commandeer those records; not whether librarians may
tell patrons that the FBI has requested their records, but whether the li-
brarians (or other custodians) could tell their attorneys, a court, or the press
that they have received a request they considered objectionable. 92
support to any public library which is subject to a federal suit or administrative enforce-
ment action for refusing to comply with the provision of the [Patriot] Act related to library
patrons' records").
88 See Eric Lichtblau, Coalition Forms to Oppose Parts of Antiterrorism Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A10. The other two provisions targeted were the "sneak and peek"
authority and the Patriot Act's expansive definition of terrorism.
89 See, e.g., Swire, supra note 47, at 1357-60 (recommending changes in procedural
requirements, advising elimination of-or at a minimum a six-month limit on-the gag
rule, and suggesting that if this authority was not used during the two years following en-
actment of the Patriot Act it may be unnecessary).
90 See Patriotic Reading, BANGOR DAILY NEws, Apr. 9, 2003, at A8 (quoting Justice
Department spokesperson Mark Corallo's assertion that concerns about section 215 of the
Patriot Act are "completely wrong because, for the FBI to check on a citizen's reading habits,
it must get a search warrant. And to get a warrant, it must convince a judge 'there is prob-
able cause that the person you are seeking the information for is a terrorist or a foreign
spy."'). No probable cause showing is required. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
9' See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of Barbara Comstock, Dir. of Pub. Af-
fairs, Regarding Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (July 30, 2003), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/July/03-opa_426.htm ("Section 215 can only be used in a
narrow set of investigations: (1) to obtain foreign intelligence information about people
who are neither American citizens nor lawful permanent residents ...."); see also Zenaida
A. Gonzalez, FBI Can Request Library Logs, FLA. TODAY, Sept. 23, 2002, at I ("Mark
Corallo, a spokesman with the Department of Justice [said] that 'U.S. citizens cannot be
investigated under this act."'). This is also incorrect. The powers conferred by section 215
can apply to American citizens. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
92 In one recent poll, 53% of those surveyed favored permitting the government "to re-
quire libraries to turn over records in terrorism investigations and preventing the librarians
from revealing to the patrons" that the records had been turned over. UNIV. OF CONN. CTR. FOR
SURVEY RESEARCH & ANALYSIS ("CSRA"), NEw NATIONAL POLL ON THE USA PATRIOT
ACT (2005), available at http://www.csra.uconn.edu/pdf/PATRIOTACTPRESS RELEASE.pdf.
The framing of the question, suggesting that an alternative to section 215 is to allow librari-
ans to tell suspects that they are under investigation, may well have influenced the re-
sponse. In the same poll, 55% percent of respondents opposed permitting the government
to "require banks to turn over records to the government without a judge's prior approval,"
a question loaded in the other direction. Id. When a June 2005 Harris Poll asked instead
whether the respondent favored "closer monitoring of banking and credit card transactions,
to trace funding sources," the results shifted, and 62% favored the benign-sounding closer
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Congress revealed its own wariness of this expansion of power in the
Patriot Act itself, by imposing a sunset on this provision93 and providing
for special oversight of its implementation. 94 Subsequent dramatic events
in Congress showed that these concerns did not diminish over time. Sev-
eral attempts by the House of Representatives to restrict the breadth of this
power were stymied by partisan politics.
The first attempt came on March 7, 2003, when Rep. Bernie Sanders
(I-Vt.), one of the sixty-six representatives who had voted against the Patriot
Act, introduced the Freedom to Read Protection Act. 95 This act would
have returned the standards used to determine whether the FBI could ob-
tain FISA orders to investigate library patrons and bookstore customers
to those in force before the Patriot Act's passage. 96 Under Rep. Sanders's
bill, the FBI would still have access to these records via a court-ordered
search warrant, but reasonable cause, instead of the lower standard of sec-
tion 215, would be a prerequisite to such a warrant. The act also called for
public reporting to determine how provisions of the Patriot Act are being
implemented, in order to allow better assessment of its effects on civil
liberties. 97
As described on Rep. Sanders's website, the vote on his bill led to
high drama in the House of Representatives on July 8, 2004.
[T]he amendment, facing threat of a Presidential veto, received
a majority of votes in the U.S. House when the time for voting
expired. However, the House Republican Leadership then held
open the vote twice as long as scheduled, an additional 20 min-
utes, as they "persuaded" Republicans to switch their votes. As
Democratic members chanted, "Shame, Shame, Shame," Repub-
lican leaders closed the vote on a 210 to 210 tie.98
The Act thus did not pass.
monitoring. HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., HARRIS POLL #51 (2005), available at http://www.
harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp? PID =580.
93 Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
94 Patriot Act § 215 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. 1 2001)).
95 To Amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to Exempt Bookstores and Li-
braries from Orders Requiring the Production of Any Tangible Things for Certain Foreign
Intelligence Investigations, and for Other Purposes (Freedom to Read Protection Act of 2003),
H.R. 1157, 108th Cong. (2003).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 45-53.
97 H.R. 1157.
98 Press Release, Bernie Sanders, Republican Leadership Hijacks U.S. House to Defeat
Sanders' Patriot Act Amendment (July 8, 2004), available at http://bemie.house.gov/
documents/releases/20040708183514.asp; see also Eric Lichtblau, Effort to Curb Scope of
Antiterrorism Law Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at A16 (describing how frustrated
Democrats "shouted 'Shame, Shame!' and 'Democracy!' as the voting continued").
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Rep. Sanders tried again, and his bill passed as an amendment to an
appropriations bill on June 15, 2005, by a vote of 238 to 187. 99 The ap-
propriations bill as reported in the Senate, however, did not include this
amendment.' 00
During the sunset debates in 2005, both the Senate and the House
focused on section 215, and both offered very modest amendments to this
provision. On July 21, the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously ap-
proved the bipartisan Specter-Feinstein bill renewing the provisions of
the Patriot Act but amending section 215 to: (1) require that the govern-
ment provide a "statement of facts" (as opposed to a mere certification)
explaining to the court why the records are being sought, (2) require some
connection with an agent of a foreign power, and (3) provide custodians
with a right to consult counsel and to challenge the demand in court.""
These amendments were welcomed by the American Library Association,0 2
but did not provide all the safeguards critics had requested.0 3 The Senate
bill also provided enhanced oversight provisions" and a new four year
sunset for section 215, although almost all other renewed provisions were
made permanent. 105 On July 29, the Senate approved the bill by unanimous
consent. 10
6
The House of Representatives passed its own Patriot Act renewal bill
on July 21, 2005.107 The House did not vote on some of the amendments
99 See H.R. 2862, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H4494, 4534-43, 4551 (2005) (en-
acted); Eric Lichtblau, House Votes for a Permanent Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2005, at A11.
1o See Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2006, H.R. 2862.RS, 109th Cong. (as reported in Senate, June 23, 2005).
101 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, S. 1389, 109th
Cong. § 7 (2005). Under section 215, as amended, the application for a disclosure order would
be required to include a statement of facts that demonstrate "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve" that the records or items sought are relevant to an investigation for foreign intelli-
gence information and pertain to a foreign power. Id. § 7(a)(1). The FISA court would be
required to find that those grounds for belief are reasonable. Id. § 7(a)(2). The tangible
things sought would need to be described with "sufficient particularity." Id. § 7(b). Ap-
proval from the Director or Deputy Director of the FBI would be required for certain ap-
plications, such as for library circulation records. Id. § 7(c). The amendments would also
allow for a disclosure order to be challenged. Id. § 7(e).
102 Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression, ABFFE Update: PATRIOT Act Show-
down Looms (Oct. 5, 2005), http://www.abffe.com/updatelO-05-05.html (urging support
for Senate amendments).
103 One could only bring such a challenge in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
where it would be heard and decided in secret, on the basis of secret evidence. Notice of
the right to challenge.would not be required. The bill also did not impose any limits on the
permanent secrecy order, although it did make it possible to challenge the order. For a
partisan discussion of the legislative process and how close it came to changes regarded by
critics as desirable, see, e.g, Posting by Lisa Graves to Reform the Patriot Act Blog, (July
30, 2005, 12:38 EST) http://blog.reformthepatriotact.org/index.php?/archives/2005/07.html.
'04 S. 1389 § 7(f).
I 5 S. 1389 § 9.
106 See Eric Lichtblau, Senate Makes Permanent Nearly All Provisions of Patriot Act,
With a Few Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A11.
107 USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3199,
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the Senate had adopted because the House Rules Committee voted to disal-
low floor votes on half of the proposed amendments, including a reprise
of the Sanders bill. °8 The House bill included a "relevance" standard in-
stead of the heightened Senate standard (which would require submission
of a statement of facts and some nexus with terrorism)." 9 However, like
the Senate bill, the House bill provided that a custodian may consult an
attorney and challenge the order in the FISA court."10 The House bill made
almost all provisions of the Patriot Act permanent but provided a ten year
sunset for section 215, in contrast to the Senate's four year sunset."' A mo-
tion to recommit the bill to the Committee to reconsider the sunset provi-
sions split the House and barely lost by a vote of 209 to 218.112 Neither
the House nor the Senate modified the duration or scope of the gag order,
which remained permanent and automatic.
The draft conference bill to reconcile the House and Senate bills in-
cluded a diluted version of the Senate's standard of proof and provided a
seven year sunset."3
B. Section 505: National Security Letters
1. Contents and Critique
Section 505... goes even further than section 215 in circumventing
judicial oversight of the government's collection of information from third
party custodians. It allows the government to obtain records from a commu-
nications provider by issuing its own administrative subpoena, called a
National Security Letter ("NSL"), to seek a various types of information
about the customers of communications providers, including telephone
companies, Internet service providers, and libraries with computer termi-
109th Cong. (2005). The difference between the House and Senate titles is telling. See S.
1389 (titled "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005"). For a com-
parison of the provisions of the House and Senate bills, see CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND
TECH., supra note 5.
10s See DISSENTING VIEWS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 3199, supra note 14. The House bill
thus did not follow the Senate in enhancing the showing required for a section 215 order,
and did not follow through on earlier attempts to exempt libraries from the lower Patriot
Act standard.
109 H.R. 3199 § 8(a).
"
0 Id. § 8(c).
I See id. § 3.
112 151 CONG. REC. H6293, 6306-08 (daily ed. July 21, 2005).
13 See Lichtblau, Congress Nears Deal to Renew Antiterror Law, supra note 5. The
gag order was to remain indefinite and comprehensive, with an exception for consulting
counsel. Id.
14 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 505, 115 Stat. 272,
365 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (Supp. 11 2002)). This section amends part of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") of 1986, which was modeled on the
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000). See infra note
279.
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.nals." 5 Section 505 both dispenses with any showing of individualized sus-
picion and any form of antecedent judicial review.1 6 The Patriot Act elimi-
nated the previous requirement of a showing that "specific and articulable
facts existed" that the target was a "foreign power" or "agent of a foreign
power.""' Now, the government only needs to certify that information rele-
vant to a terrorism investigation may be obtained. Section 505 also carries a
nondisclosure provision even more broadly worded than the gag order of
section 215, prohibiting any provider or agent served with an NSL from
disclosing to "any person" that the FBI has sought or obtained records pur-
suant to this authority." 8
The critique of this provision is the same as the critique of section
215-judicial role is inadequate and the gag order overly restrictive-but
is even more fervent because section 505 contemplates no judicial role at
all and institutes a more comprehensive gag order."9 The government has
ardently defended its administrative subpoena power and sought to expand
its use, 2 ° arguing that the NSL is comparable to a grand jury subpoena. 2 '
2. Implementation and Litigation of Section 505
The public learned from a 2005 Washington Post article, rather than
a government report or court order, that the FBI has issued more than 30,000
National Security Letters a year, an astronomical increase over "historic
norms."'
122
The Justice Department had argued that, as with section 215, all in-
formation about use of this authority, even statistical information, should
" The government may seek a customer's "name, address, length of service, and toll
•.. billing records" if a sufficiently highly placed agent certifies that this information is
"relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clan-
destine intelligence activities." 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(1) (Supp. II 2002). The provision con-
tains the same partial limitation as section 215 by requiring that "such an investigation of a
United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment." Id.
"
6 The ECPA, which was amended by this section, required the government to show a
specific reason to believe a nexus between the target and a foreign power existed. See Doe
v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 481-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
,17 Swire, supra note 47, at 1333. "Foreign power" and "agent of a foreign power" are
defined at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)-(b) (Supp. II 2002). This expansion parallels the enhanced
authority conferred by section 215 to seek information under FISA even absent a reason to
believe, as would have been required for other surveillance orders under FISA, that the
target is an agent of a foreign power.
1s Patriot Act § 505, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (Supp. II 2002). This provision, like the sec-
tion 215 nondisclosure provision, has no time limit or procedure for obtaining relief, but,
unlike section 215, does not even permit the recipient to share information with the em-
ployees or persons whose cooperation might be required to comply with the demand.
"1
9 See BEESON & JAFFER, supra note 18, at 13.
120 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USA PATRIOT ACT OVERVIEW, http://www.lifeandliberty.
gov/patriot overview-pversion.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
121 See Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 484-87, 493.
122 Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny: In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau Exam-
ines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at AO1.
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be exempt from disclosure to the public.'23 Unlike the section 215 FOIA
litigation, 24 a FOIA lawsuit yielded a redacted list of instances of NSL
use, which showed that section 505 had been used hundreds, perhaps thou-
sands of times, but did not provide any actual number. 125 The FBI is re-
quired to report to Congress twice a year on the use of this authority, but
the scope of the obligation is vague and members of Congress complained
publicly that the reports were not always submitted promptly, making
oversight difficult.
26
In retrospect, it seems likely that one reason the government has had
so little occasion to use section 215 is that, at least as to some providers
(including telephone and Internet providers), the government can avail
itself of the more convenient self service of section 505.127
Two attempts to litigate the constitutionality of this section bear marks
of the same distortions in the litigation process that plagued the section
215 litigation: the impact of secrecy, the difference between the rights of
targets and custodians, and the privileged position of First Amendment com-
pared to Fourth Amendment claims. The first lawsuit challenging this sec-
tion was brought by an Internet service provider who was served with an
NSL. Instead of complying with the NSL, as virtually all other recipients
had, this provider consulted counsel, even though the gag order on its
face contained no exception for consulting counsel or anyone else. 28 The
provider's counsel, the ACLU, filed a John Doe complaint claiming that
section 505 violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
123 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Security Archive, et al. in Support of Plain-
tiffs-Appellees at 25-29, Ashcroft v. Doe, appeal pending sub nom. Doe v. Gonzales, No.
05-0570-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 2, 2005) (discussing the public's inability to learn about usage of
NSLs). Compare this level of secrecy with FISA, which requires public reporting of the
number of times FISA orders have been issued. See infra note 159.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
125 See ACLU, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS NSLs SINCE 10/26/2001 (2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/patriotfoia/FOIA/NSLlists.pdf. The list was so heavily redacted that
little more than a general idea of the volume of use could be gleaned from viewing it.
'
2 6 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Security Archive, et al., supra note 122, at
30-31; Hearing of the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence Holds a Hearing on the USA Pa-
triot Act of 2001, 109th Cong. (Apr. 27, 2005) (comment of Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Or.))
("The Department of Justice is required to report to this committee on the use of national
security letters by the FBI. We haven't gotten the report for 2004. We haven't gotten it. So
that makes it hard for us to do oversight .... ).
27 This would explain apparent inconsistencies with Department of Justice reports on
the non-usage of section 215. See Hudson, supra note 28 ("The Justice Department's claim
that the Patriot Act has never been used to search public library records came as a surprise
to the American Library Association, which says it runs contrary to previous reports.");
Dan Mihalopoulos, Suit Contests Anti-Terror Patriot Act, CHI. TRIB., July 31, 2003, at 10
("[An] FBI official said Wednesday that Patriot Act powers have been employed about 50
times to examine library computer records.").
"
2 8 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Doe claimed that
the FBI agent who informed him he was going to be served with an NSL told him he would be
permitted to consult counsel; according to the agent, Doe informed the agent he intended
to consult counsel but did not receive any ostensible authorization to do so.
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Here again, the secrecy surrounding the implementation of this power
meant that the unidentified target-the subscriber whose records were
actually sought-did not participate in the litigation. The government's
interpretation of the need for secrecy also complicated the course of the
litigation brought by the custodian. The ACLU, named as co-plaintiff, had
initially filed the complaint under seal so as to avoid violating the very non-
disclosure provision it was challenging. The parties agreed that docu-
ments would be redacted before being made public (to avoid divulging
John Doe's identity and to avoid disclosing what information the FBI had
been seeking) and that further filings would be made under seal. When
the redacted complaint became public, the ACLU posted the briefing sched-
ule of the case on its website. The government objected to this disclosure
as violating the sealing order. 29 In response, the ACLU moved to unseal
the case in part, arguing that although certain aspects of the litigation should
remain sealed, there was no real government interest in sealing informa-
tion like docket entries. Thus, the court's first decision in the case-
mediating what could be disclosed to the public about the litigation itself-
anticipated the merits of the challenge to the constitutionality of the non-
disclosure provision. 3 °
In his subsequent decision on the merits, Judge Victor Marrero ac-
knowledged that targets have only "a limited Fourth Amendment interest
in records which they voluntarily convey to a third party."'' Judge Marrero
found that recipients of orders to surrender information, however, have an
independent Fourth Amendment right that any seizure of information in
their possession be conducted in a "reasonable" manner. 3 2 The minimum
procedure required in connection with such a seizure of information in-
cludes the availability of a neutral tribunal to determine whether or not the
demand complies with the Fourth Amendment.' 33
The government argued that the court could find section 505 consti-
tutional by construing it to allow the NSL recipient to consult with coun-
sel and to bring a judicial proceeding contesting the constitutionality of
129 According to the ACLU website, the government demanded that the ACLU redact
from its filed papers (1) a sentence that described John Doe's business as "provid[ing]
clients with the ability to access the Internet," and (2) a direct quote from a Supreme Court
case. In both these instances, the court allowed these sentences to be disclosed to the pub-
lic. See ACLU, Government Gag Exposed, http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.
cfm?ID= 16275&c=262 (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
130 Doe v. Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
13' Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 494 n. 118; see also id. at 508 n.171 ("Courts have ... con-
clude[d] that internet users have no Fourth Amendment right to prohibit disclosure of in-
formation they have voluntarily turned over to ISPs."). The court did find that Internet
users have an independent First Amendment right. See infra text accompanying note 137.
32 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 494-96 (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 651-52 (1950)).
131 Once the custodian is in front of the tribunal, what he or she can argue is limited to
whether the demand for production is unreasonably oppressive for the custodian (e.g., so
broad as to be unduly burdensome). See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1967).
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the particular demand for information. The court rejected this argument,
finding that the statute, in the manner in which it was being applied, ex-
erted an "undue coercive effect" on NSL recipients because the recipient
was not told that counsel could be consulted or that any form of judicial
review might be available. 3 4 All but the most "mettlesome and undaunted"
providers, the judge observed, would feel coerced into complying with the
demand for information and the demand of absolute and permanent si-
lence.'35 Focusing on the statufe as applied, the court did not address the
issue of whether the statute was indeed violative of the Fourth Amendment
on its face.'36 It instead found that section 505 could be used in a manner
that infringed the First Amendment rights of subscribers'3 7 and that the
broad nondisclosure provision of section 505 violated the First Amend-
ment.'38
During the next year, while the sunset hearings were pending, an un-
named organization (described in the complaint as a member of the Ameri-
can Library Association) was also served with an NSL, risked violating the
statute's gag order to contact the ACLU, and filed a lawsuit.'39 This suit
134 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). As Judge Marrero
noted, even before this decision several bills were pending in Congress to provide explicit
authorization of judicial review, and to provide exceptions allowing recipients of NSLs to
consult counsel and those employees or others necessary for compliance. See id. at 493.
Judge Marrero thought it would be inappropriate for the court to interpret a statute crea-
tively in order to render it constitutional when Congress itself had embarked on the task of
amending the statute. He offered a thoughtful analysis of the relative roles of Congress and
the federal court in this situation. Id. at 500-01.
The opinion also comments diplomatically on whether Congress intended the differences
between the procedures respecting these NSLs and other parallel powers, or whether these
discrepancies were a result of hasty drafting. Id. at 491-92.
"I Id. at 502. This conclusion was based in part on the fact that although-according
to a document the ACLU obtained in a separate FOIA lawsuit-at least hundreds of NSLs
had been served, evidently no recipient had ever brought a challenge to the propriety or
legality of the demands. Id.
Another impediment to possible litigation by custodians asked to provide information
is that the Patriot Act's endorsement of nationwide jurisdiction means that custodians may
confront practical difficulties inherent in litigating a production order in the jurisdiction in
which it was issued, which might be anywhere in the country. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr.,
Criminal Law, Rule of Law, Post-September 11th Counterterrorism Measures: The Rule of
Law, Terrorism, and Countermeasures Including the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 43, 62 n.68 (2004).
'36 Doe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
"I The basis for this aspect of the ruling was that individual Internet subscribers have a
First Amendment right to engage in anonymous Internet speech, even though that right
could be trumped in a particular case. Id. at 506-10. The court did not rule that subscribers
have any right under the Fourth Amendment, but at the same time it did not endorse the
conclusion that the Miller and Smith cases, holding that other types of business records are
not covered by the Fourth Amendment, are indistinguishable. See id. at 508.
138 Id. at 511-27. The court enjoined enforcement of the nondisclosure provision, finding
it a prohibited prior restraint on speech. The government appealed and was granted a stay
of the preliminary injunction. Gonzales v. Doe, No. 05-0570cv (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2005).
139 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Doe v. Gonzales, No. 3:05-
1256 (D. Conn. filed Aug. 9, 2005), available at http://action.aclu.org/nsl/legal/redacted-
complaint082405.pdf.
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was also filed under seal, and also began with the plaintiffs' request to lift
the gag order to allow facts about the litigation to be made public. The plain-
tiffs' counsel said, "Essentially the government is using the Patriot Act to
silence people who question the Patriot Act."'4 Judge Janet Hall granted the
motion to lift the gag order, as Judge Marrero had, and stayed her order
to permit the government to appeal. 14
1
3. Public and Legislative Reaction
At least one commentator has expressed concern about the breadth
of this enhanced surveillance law. 14 Public response to this section has not
been measured. Were this power better known and understood, it is difficult
to imagine the public would find it more acceptable than section 215.
Members of the public objecting to some or all of the section 215 author-
ity expressed concern about the ease of the government's access to personal
records, especially records that implicate First Amendment protected ac-
tivity.43 If the public was so concerned about libraries and bookstores,
would it be any less concerned with records of Internet usage?
Section 505 was not one of the Patriot Act sections scheduled to sun-
set.'" Nevertheless, members of Congress debated this provision during
the sunset hearings, evidently inspired by the District Court decision finding
it partly unconstitutional. 4 5 The executive branch was unwilling to de-
fend the constitutionality of the broad and indefinite gag order either in
court or in Congress.'46 The Senate Patriot Act renewal bill amended sec-
tion 505 along the lines suggested by the government in litigating the
Doe case. 147 The House bill also allowed recipients of NSLs to bring a
140 ACLU, "National Security Letters" and Your Privacy: Librarians Gagged from Par-
ticipating in Patriot Act Debate, http://action.aclu.org/reformthepatriotact/nsl.html (last visited
Oct. 29, 2005).
14 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).
141 Swire, supra note 47, at 1333 (concluding that the expanded scope "likely deserves
significant attention" because of its expansion of previous law).
141 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
144 In fact, Title V contains no sunset provisions at all. Compare Patriot Act, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (providing sunset provisions for Title II), with id. §§ 501-
508.
145 See Material Witness Provisions of the Criminal Code, and the Implementation of
the USA Patriot Act: Section 505 that Addresses National Security Letters, and Section 804
that Addresses Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed at U.S. Facilities Abroad: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1, 23, 64-66, 72 (2005) (referring and reacting to the District Court
decision).
4 See id. at 69-70.
147 The bill permitted recipients of an NSL to consult counsel and to challenge the NSL
in court under standards similar to review of a grand jury subpoena. USA PATRIOT Im-
provement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, S. 1389, 109th Cong. § 8 (2005). The court is
provided with a standard under which it may decide to set aside the secrecy order: whether
the disclosure would harm national security, interfere with an investigation, interfere with
diplomatic relations, or endanger life or physical safety. If the government certifies that
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court challenge and to move to set aside the secrecy order under a com-
parable standard.' 48 It also provided new, explicit penalties for violating the
gag order.49 Nonetheless, neither bill provided for any standard of indi-
vidualized suspicion or even a statement of facts for a reviewing court to
consult in determining whether the NSL is oppressive or unreasonable. 5 '
The House did not adopt the more extensive set of amendments in the Stop
Self-Authorized Secret Searches Act, introduced in May 2005 by Rep.
Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.).15 1
C. Section 218: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
1. Contents and Critique
Section 218 expands the power of the government to use FISA warrants
to conduct electronic surveillance instead of proceeding under the more
demanding standards of Title III, which covers criminal investigations. 52
The actual provision in the Patriot Act enigmatically provides, in its en-
tirety, that two specified sections of FISA "are each amended by striking
'the purpose' and inserting 'a significant purpose.""53 This seemingly trivial
semantic amendment effected a major expansion of the government's au-
thority to conduct electronic surveillance. The government now only needs
to persuade the FISA court that there is probable cause to believe that the
target is an "agent of a foreign power," rather than persuading a regular
one of these forms of harm would result, that certification is to be treated as "conclusive."Id.
148 H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. § 116 (as passed by House, July 21, 2005). Representatives
did not vote on an amendment similar to the Senate's to allow NSL recipients to consult
counsel. See 51 CONG. REC. H6221, 6230-31 (2005) (statement of Rep. Waters, referring
to the Doe ruling).
149 H.R. 3199, § 118.
150 This attention to the gag order and secrecy provisions may not have indicated opposi-
tion to the use of administrative subpoenas generally. While the sunset debates were pro-
ceeding, the Senate Intelligence Committee considered, behind closed doors, whether to
afford the government more extensive use of administrative subpoenas. Press Release,
ACLU, ACLU Disappointed with Patriot Act Expansion Bill Approved in Secret; Says
"Administrative Subpoenas" Create End-Run Round Constitution (June 7, 2005), available
at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=18423&c=206. The proposal for
enhancing the administrative subpoena power was dropped as part of the compromise in
the draft conference bill. See Lichtblau, Congress Nears Deal to Renew Antiterrorism Law,
supra note 5.
5I Press Release, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Rep. Nadler Introduces Bipartisan Stop Self-
Authorized Secret Searches Act (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/press/nyO8_nadler/SSSH052605.html (giving the recipient of an NSL the right to chal-
lenge the letter and its nondisclosure requirement, to receive legal counsel, and to chal-
lenge the use of the records; requiring notice to the target if the government seeks to use
the records obtained under an NSL in subsequent proceedings; and placing a time limit on
the gag order subject to a court-approved extension).
152 See supra note 57.
I Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272 (amending 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000)).
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court that there is probable cause to believe that the target is involved in
criminal activity. 5 4 Critics described section 218 as razing the wall that pre-
vious law had erected between criminal law enforcement and intelligence
gathering, while others maintained that no such wall had actually existed
under the earlier law.'55 Although the import of this amendment has been
debated, the principal constitutional challenge to this expanded authority
remains the same: that electronic surveillance should not be permitted in
the absence of a more traditional judicial finding of probable cause.
As was the case with other Patriot Act provisions, section 218 was
not the first or only expansion of the power conferred under FISA or the first
contraction of FISA's initial safeguards. 5 6 Questions were raised about the
constitutionality of FISA's compromise long before critics leveled similar
charges at the Patriot Act,'57 claiming that the statute dispenses with a find-
ing of traditional probable cause, requires less particularity, has no provi-
sion for even post hoc notice to the target (unless the government decides
to use evidence derived from a FISA search in court),'58 and allows a secret
ex parte court to issue surveillance orders.'59 On the other hand, the original
statute did include a number of safeguards similar to those required when
electronic surveillance is conducted in connection with a criminal investi-
gation 6 -- like some judicial review of the government's reasons for select-
114 Attorney General Ashcroft himself referred to the enhanced powers conferred by this
provision as amounting to a "revolution." John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., Remarks at the
News Conference Regarding Decision of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Re-
view (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/11 /ag 11802.html.
"I See, e.g., William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveil-
lance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2003) (contending that a wall had
existed in practice); Swire, supra note 47, at 1338 (finding more persuasive the argument
that the Patriot Act changed the permissible level of information sharing).
156 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829 (2000) (providing that FISA orders could be used to
authorize physical searches in 1995 amendments); id. §§ 1841-1846 (allowing installation
of pen registers and trap and trace devices in 1998 amendments); id. § 1801(b)(2)(D) (ex-
panding the definition of "agent of a foreign power" in 1999 amendments); see also Swire,
supra note 47, at 1354-56 (remarking that the expanded definition of "agent of a foreign
power" could render Title III obsolete).
17 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 18, at 44 (describing broad scope of FISA author-
ity).
i'58 In contrast to the case-by-case evaluation required even under section 213, the lack
of notice under FISA is categorical. See infra text accompanying notes 195-200.
19 Out of 18,372 applications to the special FISA court established under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1803 to consider the government's requests, fewer than 100 were modified in any manner
and only four were ultimately denied. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ANNUAL
REPORTS (1979-2004) [hereinafter FISA ANNUAL REPORTS] (pursuant to the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1807 (2000)), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/; see also Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1290 (2004) (criticizing the FISA court's secrecy and
government-favoring procedure).
160 For a general comparison of Title III and FISA, see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717, 737-42 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (concluding that although the two statutes have many
overlapping procedures, the FISA order "may not be a 'warrant' contemplated by the
Fourth Amendment," but "comes close to meeting Title III").
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ing a target, and some minimization requirement. ' The Supreme Court
has never ruled on the constitutionality of FISA, although there may be
claims of unconstitutionality in both directions-that FISA grants too
much or too little power to the executive.'62
Here, as with the sections previously described, targets and people who
might be "aggrieved" by the use of such surveillance powers cannot avail
themselves of any judicial remedy' 63 because they are not given notice of
the fact that they have been the subject of a search."6 Such notice pre-
sumably would be given in a criminal prosecution where the government
is planning to introduce evidence obtained under FISA, so the govern-
ment can again control the existence and timing of litigation by not bring-
ing to trial criminal prosecutions supported by evidence derived from FISA-
based surveillance. 16 Nevertheless, the constitutionality of section 218
has been the subject of a judicial opinion, handed down in a highly un-
usual ex parte proceeding.166
2. Implementation and Litigation of Section 218
As the account of the litigation below will show, the government be-
gan using this authority promptly and has used it extensively. According
to Attorney General Gonzales, the government has submitted seventy-four
percent more applications to the FISA court since the Patriot Act was en-
acted, all of which have been granted. 67 Although these numbers are
available, there is no way for the public to evaluate how many applications
would not have met the standards of Title III, how much useful informa-
tion has been obtained as a result of such surveillance, or whether any of
this information has prevented terrorist actions. 168
161 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (2000).
162 One might argue either that the statutory scheme confers too much executive power
and offends the Fourth Amendment, or that it imposes too many limits and violates the
separation of powers by purporting to limit executive authority conferred by Article II.
163 See 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2000) (providing a civil remedy for aggrieved persons).
'64 Even a criminal defendant who must, under the statute, be notified of the govern-
ment's intent to use FISA-derived evidence might not learn whether there is any reason to
be aggrieved by the circumstances of the surveillance because the court may decide, on
application of the government, that disclosure or an adversary hearing concerning that
particular surveillance may harm the national security and thus conduct review in camera
and ex parte. See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2000).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 69-83.
166 See infra text accompanying notes 169-187.
167 The History and Application of the USA Patriot Act and the Importance of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Intelli-
gence, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen. and Robert S.
Mueller, III, Dir., FBI), available at http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/testimony/042705-ag-
gonzalesfbimueller.pdf. According to the testimony, 1758 FISA applications were made
and granted, although in ninety-four instances the requested authority was modified. Id.
168 The Department of Justice claims that this power has been essential. See DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 120; see also NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 416-19 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 CoMMIs-
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The only case thus far concerning the constitutionality of section 218
took place in a unique context where the government was the only party
to the litigation. Perhaps due to the distortions of the procedural context,
the special court hearing the case essentially replicated legislative reasoning
in concluding that the provision is reasonable. That the litigation arose at
all was serendipitous. In March 2002, the Attorney General asked the FISA
court to adopt new supplemental procedures which endorsed the use of
FISA in investigations to be initiated, directed, or controlled by law en-
forcement rather than intelligence officials-a breach of the "wall" between
these two functions. On May 17, 2002, the FISA court wrote an opinion
rejecting the proposed procedures and requiring the government to follow
certain restrictions with respect to its surveillance orders.' 6 9 The court held
that the government's proposed procedures would have eliminated safe-
guards that prevented the government from inappropriately merging the
criminal and intelligence surveillance powers. 170
The government appealed this decision to the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court of Review ("FISCR"), which Congress had created to hear
appeals from the FISA court. This court had never before convened be-
cause the government, the only party in such proceedings, had virtually
never lost in the FISA court 7' and thus had previously had no reason to
seek review of that court's decisions. The appeal was, of course, ex parte,
with the government appellant as the only party.
The existence of this appeal, perhaps surprisingly, became public be-
cause the FISA court-in response to the query by Senator Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.) about the implementation of section 218-decided to publish its
May 2002 decision.7 2 When the opinion became public, two groups, the
ACLU and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
("NACDL"), submitted amicus briefs to the appellate court. They argued
against the government's construction of the amendment's impact on the
previous statutory scheme and also argued that, no matter how construed,
the revision violated the Fourth Amendment. The FISCR accepted the
amicus briefs, but the amici were not invited to appear before the court to
argue orally. Had these groups not filed amicus briefs, the constitutional
issue might not have been raised or considered by the FISCR at all.
SION REPORT] (discussing the importance of information sharing), available at http://www.
9-11 commission.gov/report/9 11 Report.pdf.
169 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 623 (FISA Ct. 2002). The FISA court found that the government was abus-
ing its FISA authority by using it in criminal investigations in "an alarming number of
instances." Id. at 620.
170 Id.
'71 See FISA ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 159.
'72In re All Matters Submitted, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (published opinion); The USA Pa-
triot Act in Practice: Shedding Light on the FISA Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/memberstatement.cfm?id
=398&witid=50.
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The FISCR considered the argument of the amici that Congress had
impermissibly attempted to modify the Fourth Amendment's minimum pro-
cedures. One argument considered was whether such searches are reason-
able-despite the fact that FISA orders are not the equivalent of search
warrants issued on the basis of probable cause' 73-under a Supreme Court
doctrine that creates an exception to the probable cause requirement for
cases involving "special needs."'74 Since FISA was first drafted, the Su-
preme Court has decided cases specifying that a "special needs" search is
one whose,"primary purpose" is not criminal law enforcement.' 75 The
original language of FISA, allowing surveillance only if "the" purpose was
to gather foreign intelligence, could easily have passed this test; the Pa-
triot Act language on its face does not, because if foreign intelligence
gathering is only "a significant" purpose of the surveillance, the primary
purpose might still be criminal law enforcement.
The FISCR construed the statute as intentionally rejecting the Fourth
Amendment's "primary purpose" requirement, 7 6 which presumably would
have rendered the provision unconstitutional under the Supreme Court spe-
cial needs cases. The court decided not to apply the special needs cases, but
instead to make its own independent assessment of whether the legisla-
tion was "reasonable."'' 77 In doing so, the court relied on dicta in the Su-
preme Court's Keith case that standards different from those imposed by
Title III "may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are rea-
sonable both in relation to the legitimate need of the government for in-
telligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.' ' 78 The
special needs cases define one type of "reasonable" exception to the Fourth
Amendment default rules, but not the only one. The court declared that "the
constitutional question presented by this case-whether Congress's dis-
approval of the primary purpose test is consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment-has no definitive jurisprudential answer."'179 The court then found
that, even without factoring in the President's claim of inherent author-
ity,8 0 "the procedures and government showings required under FISA, if
171 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 741 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (discussing whether
the FISA order may not amount to a traditional warrant).
74 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (holding that a special
need beyond law enforcement justifies a warrantless search of probationer's home).
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000); see also Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 n. 15, 80 (2001).
176 The court held that the Patriot Act amendment had actually erected a wall where
none had existed, adding a provision allowing for the sharing of information by intelli-
gence and law enforcement officials and thus explicitly recognizing that dichotomy for the
first time. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 728-41. In so doing, the court rejected the argu-
ment that FISA had originally been intended to be mutually exclusive with criminal law
investigations conducted under Title III.
177In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742, 746.
171 Id. at 742 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23
(1972)). See infra Part III.B.2.b for background on Keith.
179 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
190 The court distinguished between the argument it was not considering-that FISA
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they do not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards, cer-
tainly come close" and should therefore be deemed "reasonable" under the
Keith balancing test.'8'
The court acknowledged that its decision created a conflict with the
conclusions of some earlier appellate decisions interpreting the scope of
the FISA authority in dual purpose investigations,'82 so this case seemed
destined for review by the Supreme Court. However, since the government,
the only party to the proceeding, had now won, there was technically no
losing party and therefore no one entitled to ask the Court to hear the case.
The amici ACLU and NACDL filed a petition in the Supreme Court for
leave to intervene so that they could petition the Court for certiorari. The
motion to intervene was denied.'83
Thus, the only case to date on the constitutionality of section 218
was decided in a context where not only was no target a party, but the gov-
ernment was the only party. There was no adversarial process,"' no full oral
argument, and little prospect of Supreme Court review.'85 Perhaps because
the targets were invisible to the court, their interests were nearly invisible in
the court's opinion. The Fourth Amendment test suggested by Keith did
not require the court to ask whether some less restrictive alternative would
have been available, or even to impose any burden on the government to
show necessity.'86 Advantage to the government was built into both the
structure of the special judicial process and the underlying Fourth Amend-
ment law itself. 8
7
3. Public and Legislative Reaction
Because the statutory scheme and constitutional law involved are so
complex, it would be unrealistic to expect meaningful public assessment
had improperly limited the President's inherent power under Article II to conduct war-
rantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence-and the converse argument presented-
that FISA had improperly expanded the President's authority beyond what the Fourth
Amendment would allow. Id. at 742.
8I Id. at 746.
1821d. at 725-27, 742-45; see United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir.
1991); United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 912-13 (4th Cir. 1980). These cases, decided
after Keith, recognized a foreign intelligence surveillance exception to the usual Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, but only applied it to foreign intelligence gathering and
not to criminal investigations.
"I ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003).
114 Swire, supra note 47, at 1365-66 (advocating a more adversarial system in the FISC
and FISCR).
185 For an argument that the FISCR reached the wrong conclusion, see Michael P.
O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Power: Going, Going, Gone:
Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1234, 1244-63 (2003);
see also Swire, supra note 47, at 1339, 1352.
186 See infra text accompanying notes 258-261.
"I7 See infra text accompanying notes 359-367 for a discussion of the skew in Fourth
Amendment balancing tests.
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of the changes effected by section 218.188 Academic commentators have,
for the most part, been critical of the substantial expansion of the FISA
surveillance authority.'8 9 Proponents of this section argue that it tears down
whatever wall might have existed between the law enforcement and intel-
ligence communities and permits sharing of information. 9 ° Most debate
about the value of information sharing does not attend to the subtler con-
stitutional question actually posed: What procedures should be required,
either by the Fourth Amendment or by Congress, as a prerequisite to the
gathering of such information? Perhaps realizing that there was little pub-
lic understanding of this issue and little welcome in Congress, the coalition
lobbying to amend the Patriot Act' 91 did not include section 218 among
the three provisions it targeted.
Section 218 evidently concerned Congress in 2001. It was one of the
provisions scheduled to sunset. 92 But since then Congress has not taken any
action to repeal or limit the scope of the authority this section confers. In
fact, Congress has moved in the other direction. The so-called "Lone Wolf'
amendment' 93 now allows the easier FISA process to be used to authorize
electronic surveillance even if the target is not believed to be "a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power."
During the sunset debates, both houses of Congress voted to renew
section 218 without amendment and without sunset. 94 Courts other than the
88 When asked if they would support a proposal to "allow federal law enforcement agents
to use information collected in foreign intelligence investigations for domestic crime inves-
tigation," 81% of respondents expressed support and 15% opposition. CSRA, supra note
92. This question does not really pose the procedural question addressed by section 218:
What antecedent procedure should be required before information may be gathered in an
intelligence investigation?
189 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 135, at 66 (arguing that FISA expansion is "troubling");
Banks, supra note 155, at 1192 (describing section 218 expansion as ill-advised); Orin S.
Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 625 n.75 (2003) (arguing that section 218, unlike other Patriot Act
provisions, effects a serious expansion of government surveillance authority with possible
serious negative consequences for privacy); Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Bal-
ancing National Security with Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV.
375, 406-26 (2002) (expressing concern about expansions in the government's authority to
conduct clandestine surveillance); O'Connor & Rumann, supra note 185, at 1255-62 (con-
cluding that section 218 is unconstitutional and criticizing the FISCR opinion's "specious"
reasoning); Solove, supra note 159, at 1303 (describing section 218 as a "troubling devel-
opment" and advocating a return to pre-Patriot Act standards). The American Bar Associa-
tion ran an online "sourceblog" where different perspectives on this and other Patriot Act
issues were expressed. See Patriot Debates, http://www.patriotdebates.com (last visited
Oct. 14, 2005).
190 This was one of the chief recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which blamed
the events of September 11 in part on the lack of information sharing. 9/11 COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 168.
191 See Lichtblau, supra note 88.
192 See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
193 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 2742 (2004).
191 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, S. 1389,
109th Cong. (2005); USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of
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FISCR, including the Supreme Court, are not likely to have occasion to
review the constitutionality of this section unless the government is willing
to provoke a challenge by relying on evidence obtained under section 218
in a criminal prosecution. Here too; the legislative debate followed the pub-
lic's lack of concern or perhaps lack of knowledge about the content of this
provision, and the courts did not impose any limitation on the executive
branch beyond what Congress had provided.
D. Section 213: "Sneak and Peek"
1. Contents and Critique
Section 213, the so-called "sneak and peek" provision,'95 applies in
cases where the government has honored the Fourth Amendment norm by
obtaining a search warrant based on probable cause. This provision al-
lows the government to ask a court for permission to defer notifying the
target that a search (or sometimes even a seizure) has taken place on a find-
ing, inter alia, that immediate notification might have "an adverse result."'
' 96
The delay in notification may be extended, apparently indefinitely, "for
good cause shown."'9 7 This authority is not limited to terrorism investiga-
tions and was not scheduled to sunset.' Courts are left a great deal of dis-
cretion: The statute provides no time limit, 99 the standard to be applied is
fairly open ended, and notification of seizures as well as searches may be de-
ferred.2°°
Critics of this section claim that the Fourth Amendment requires notice
prior to a search. The searches affected by this provision are conducted
pursuant to a search warrant, and frequently take place in homes-a venue
the Supreme Court has found to enjoy special protection.20 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held, although only relatively recently, that searches
2005, H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. (2005). The House bill provided for the "Lone Wolf'
amendment to sunset again in four years. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004 § 6001. The draft conference report changed the sunset to seven years.
See Lichtblau, Congress Nears Deal to Renew Antiterror Law, supra note 5.
195 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)
(Supp. II 2002)).
196 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1). The term "adverse result" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(2)
(2000) to include the potential for physical or other harms to a person, or damage to a
prosecution.
197 Id. § 3103a(b)(3).
198 See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
199 Judges may, but are not required to, impose a time limit. See id. § 213.
100 Id. See also C. L. "Butch" Otter & Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Preserving the Founda-
tion of Liberty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 261, 272 (2005) (describing
this authority as the "sneak-and-steal" provision). Co-author Otter is a member of Congress
(R-Idaho).
201 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001).
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are presumptively unreasonable unless law enforcement officials "knock
and announce" themselves before executing a warrant. °2 Having an op-
portunity to view the search warrant gives the target a chance to point out
any mistakes-perhaps the address is wrong 2°3-and to ensure that the
search does not exceed the scope authorized.2"
Lack of notice of a seizure allegedly constitutes a denial of due process.
Earlier Supreme Court case law also suggested that when law enforcement
agents seize property pursuant to a search warrant, due process requires that
they take "reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken so
the owner can pursue available remedies for its return."205 Without notifica-
tion, the target of a seizure might conclude that she or he was the victim
of a burglary or might be entirely unaware of the government's seizure, as
might happen if the government copies the hard drive of the target's com-
puter. Thus, the individual may not have any opportunity to challenge the
validity of the warrant or the propriety of the scope of its execution. In
this section, unlike the other Patriot Act provisions described, a judge makes
the decision in each individual case whether the statutory standard, how-
ever elastic, has been met.2
0 6
2. Implementation and Litigation of Section 213
According to a July 5, 2005, letter from the Department of Justice to
Rep. Robert C. Scott (D-Va.), the deferred notification authority was used
153 times between enactment and January 31, 2005. Only eighteen of those
uses were in terrorism investigations.2 7
There appears to have been no litigation over the constitutionality of
this provision. The very secrecy targets might wish to contest prevents tar-
gets from learning whether they have been affected by this provision. The
odds that this section will be the subject of litigation may be greater be-
cause it applies not only to terrorism investigations, where the government's
priority may be prevention rather than prosecution, but to all crimes. 20 1 It
202 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
203 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 80 (1987) (providing an example of this hap-
pening).
204 Cf. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding that a search was unconsti-
tutional when the warrant did not on its face prescribe the scope of the search, even though
supporting documents provided that information).
205 City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999).
206 See Howell, supra note 3, at 1187 (praising the Patriot Act for resolving this issue
with clear legislation rather than ad hoc judicial rulings).
207 151 CONG. REC. H6221, 6225 (2005) (statement of Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.)).
Ninety-seven of the uses were in drug investigations. Id.
208 This section does not aim to produce evidence and so is not susceptible to the usual
vehicle for Fourth Amendment claims: the motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case.
A case now pending before the Supreme Court raises the question of whether evidence
acquired in a seizure violating Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" rules is subject
to suppression under the exclusionary rule. See People v. Hudson, No. 246403, 2004 WL
1366947 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 2964 (2005).
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seems probable that if there are to be limitations on this authority, they
will come from Congress, whose members seem more troubled than many
courts have been about the specter of secret searches and seizures.
Although the Supreme Court has never decided a case on point, federal
case law in some jurisdictions already authorized some forms of delayed
notification, even in the absence of statutory authority, as "reasonable.
2 1'°
In these cases, rather than reviewing a legislative decision to allow delayed
notification, the federal courts were leading the charge.
3. Public and Legislative Reaction
Respondents in the Gallup Poll had the most negative reaction to this
provision. Seventy-one percent of those surveyed disapproved of allow-
ing agents to search a home secretly and, for an unspecified period of time,
not to inform the person of that search. 210 A number of commentators have
likewise been critical of this provision. 21 1 Perhaps recognizing the level of
concern in the legislature and among the public, the coalition lobbying
against the Patriot Act selected section 213 as one of three provisions to
target.212 An especially spirited critique singling out this provision as an
assault on our fundamental freedoms was co-authored by a member of Con-
gress, Rep. Butch Otter (R-Idaho), 213 who did not confine his criticism to
the law reviews. Otter introduced an amendment to the 2004 Appropria-
tions Bill withdrawing all federal funding for "sneak and peek" searches
under section 213. This bill passed the House of Representatives in July
2003 .214 Several other euphemistically titled bills have been introduced in
209 Rule 41(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, on its face, required prompt
notification of searches and seizures. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f) (1993) (version in effect prior
to passage of Patriot Act). Congress created a limited exception with respect to searches
involving stored electronic communications held by third parties. See 18 U.S.C. § 2705
(2000) (permitting deferred notification on a showing of danger to the life or safety of a
person, and other specified dangers).
Nevertheless, some federal courts authorized deferred notification under varying con-
ditions. The Ninth Circuit permitted notification to be deferred not more than seven days.
United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit required
a showing of necessity, an inventory of property seized, and notification within a short period
of time. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990). The authority of courts to
approve deferred notification remained unsettled. See, e.g., United States v. Pangburn, 983
F.2d 449, 453-55 (2d Cir. 1993).
210 See SAAD, supra note 9. In another poll, seventy-four percent of respondents disfa-
vored this measure. See CSRA, supra note 92.
211 See Kevin Corr, Sneaky but Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek Search Warrants, 43
KAN. L. REV. 1103 (1995); see also Baldwin, supra note 135, at 62 (describing section 213
as "troubling" while approving of other Patriot Act expansions of power); Sharon H.
Rackow, Comment, How the USA PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement
upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of "Intelligence" Investigations, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1651 (2002).
212 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
213 Otter & Brandt, supra note 200.
214 H. Amend. 292 to H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. (2003) (introduced by Rep. Otter); 149
CONG. REC. H7284, 7289-93, 7299 (daily ed. July 22, 2003).
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the House since then, but failed to become law. The Security and Freedom
Ensured Act of 2003215 would have amended the "sneak and peek" authority
by limiting the circumstances under which delayed notification is permit-
ted and requiring that notice be provided within seven days. 2 6 The Patriot
Act Oversight Restoration Act would have added a sunset date. 217 Senator
Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) recently introduced a bill to limit the use of sec-
tion 213 powers and to require a semiannual public report providing the
number of times that authority was used, the number of extensions that were
granted, and the nature of the crimes being investigated.2"8
The 2001 Congress evidently did not anticipate this level of contro-
versy. The Patriot Act did not provide for section 213 to sunset."9 During
the sunset debates, however, the provision was discussed and the result-
ing Senate bill proposed amending this section by providing time limits
circumscribing the period of delay2 0 and requiring more specific report-
ing to Congress about the provision's use. 22' The time limits, however,
included very elastic provisions allowing exceptions, making the amend-
ments vulnerable to the criticism that they do not implement any real re-
form. The House bill imposed outer limits on delayed notification and also
enhanced oversight provisions. 222
The draft conference report proposed some time limits, but the limits
were similarly elastic and subject to renewal. 223
E. Summary of Part II
Overall, the history of these four Patriot Act provisions shows that
secrecy and other forces have impeded both political and judicial account-
ability. Three of these four provisions were among the chief subjects of
debate during the sunset hearings and virtually the only provisions either
the House or Senate even considered amending. But although many peo-
ple were troubled by the breadth of these particular powers, the public did
not have enough information to evaluate how the powers had been used
or whether they had been abused. Information about the volume of sec-
25 S. 1709, 108th Cong. (2003). This bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee and never became law. See 149 CONG. REC. S12376, 12384-85 (2003).
216 S. 1709 § 3.
217 S. 1695, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
218 Reasonable Notice and Search Act, S. 316, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
219 See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
220 S. 1389, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005). The initial period of delay is limited to seven days
and extensions are limited to periods of ninety days or less, although both of these time
limits provide for exceptions if "the facts of the case justify" a longer delay.
221 Id.
222 H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. §§ 108, 121 (2005).
223 See Timothy H. Edgar, ACLU Memo to Interested Persons Regarding Conference
Report on H.R. 3199, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
(Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfmID= 19410
&c=206.
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tion 215 use was classified and a FOIA lawsuit permitted such informa-
tion to remain exempt from disclosure. 24 Attorney General Ashcroft's
disclosure about the infrequent use of the section 215 authority attempted
to quiet public (especially librarians') fears, but did not explain that this
section had not been used because section 505 provides a more conven-
ient route to much of the same information. A FOIA lawsuit compelled
the Department of Justice to divulge limited information showing that sec-
tion 505 NSLs had been used on a large but indeterminate number of oc-
casions, 2 15 but the press proved better able than the courts or Congress to
ferret out that the government was issuing 30,000 NSLs a year.2 6 Figures
on how frequently FISA orders are granted are publicly available, 2 2 as
are figures about the frequency of use of the "sneak and peek" author-
ity.228 Even so, these patches of information about the volume of use are
not very revealing. Executive discretion to conduct foreign intelligence
wiretaps was limited during the 1970s after the public learned that the
FBI had Dr. Martin Luther King under surveillance. 229 Such potentially
unsettling stories are not likely to emerge today. Targets cannot tell their
stories if they do not know they are targets, and custodians of records cannot
legally recount their own experiences. 230 With both the courts and the public
unable to learn more, congressional oversight becomes critical, but this
oversight will take place largely outside of the public purview.23' In the
.trenchant words of Elaine Scarry, "[t]he Patriot Act inverts the constitu-
tional requirement that people's lives be private and the work of government
officials be public. 2
32
It remains to be seen whether any of the Senate's modest amendments
will survive the reconciliation process. Whatever the results, the bottom
line is that the bulk of the Patriot Act provisions hastily passed in Octo-
ber 2001 seem destined to become permanent law. Attention will now
turn to the courts.
That secret investigations lead to expanded executive authority is not
news. It is more surprising that, in four years, the courts have played so
small a role in reviewing the reasonableness of these incremental delega-
224 See supra notes 63, 65.
225 See supra note 125.
226 See supra note 122.
227 See supra note 159.
228 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
229 See infra text accompanying notes 304-305.
230 If the modifications found necessary by both Congress and a district judge are re-
tained, custodians who are troubled about a request for information will at least be allowed
to consult their attorneys and a court.
231 Whether Congress has been receiving sufficient information from the Department of
Justice to fulfill its oversight functions is another issue. See supra notes 63, 123-126 and ac-
companying text.
232 Elaine Scarry, Resolving to Resist: Local Governments are Refusing to Comply with
the Patriot Act, BOSTON REV., Feb.-Mar. 2004, at 6, available at http://www.bostonreview.
net/BR29. 1/scarry.html.
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tions of power and of the government's use of its accumulated powers.
FOIA has provided the courts with some opportunity to review executive
branch decisions to withhold information, with mixed results. Yet secrecy
in many guises, combined with executive branch control of information
as well as the venue and timing of litigation about its own actions, have
created impediments to any meaningful form of judicial review. Section
218 was upheld by the FISCR, but in an ex parte case with only the gov-
ernment as a party and without a channel to Supreme Court review. 233 In a
decision still pending appeal, section 505 was found unconstitutional in
part, although not on the basis of any surveillance target's Fourth Amend-
ment rights.214 The only constitutional challenge to section 215 remains in
legal limbo, 3 ' while section 213 does not seem to have been litigated at all.
More significantly in the long run, the Supreme Court has minimized
the role of the judiciary by construing the Fourth Amendment to allow so
many deviations from principles of antecedent judicial review, individu-
alized suspicion, and notice. Even if opportunities to review the constitu-
tionality of these provisions do arise, the courts are too likely to offer prede-
termined easy answers to difficult questions about what is reasonable. Sec-
tions 215 and 505 involve governmental activities that probably will not
be defined as "searches" or "seizures" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 23 6 Section 218 may be "reasonable" under the Keith balanc-
ing test because Fourth Amendment interests are readily outweighed by
security needs. Section 213's permission to defer notice of searches and sei-
zures is likely to prove most challenging to the courts, simply because it
falls in an area of law that the Supreme Court has not developed.
Although there is some space for arguments about the constitutional-
ity of particular aspects of these provisions, 237 Congress and the Department
of Justice have exploited preexisting constitutional loopholes that, even if
they are not deemed to accommodate every aspect of all of these provi-
233 See supra text accompanying notes 172-183.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 128-138.
235 See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
236 A Department of Justice spokesperson testified that there is adequate judicial re-
view of the NSL power because if a custodian declines to comply, the government will
have to go to court for an enforcement order. See Material Witness Provisions of the Criminal
Code, and the Implementation of the USA Patriot Act: Section 505 That Addresses Na-
tional Security Letters, and Section 804 That Addresses Jurisdiction Over Crimes Commit-
ted at U.S. Facilities Abroad Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12-13, 17-18 (2005) (statement of
Matthew Berry, Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of
Justice), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/21396.pdf. How-
ever, the claim custodians can raise in court is very limited, see supra text accompanying
notes 132-133, custodians are not likely to resist such requests (as shown by the fact that
in four years, tens of thousands of NSLs were served but only two custodians are known to
have come forward to challenge government demands), and this is an extremely haphazard
means of protecting the privacy interests of targets.
237 See infra text accompanying note 325.
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sions, do invite most. The next Section investigates why there were so many
large loopholes in the Fourth Amendment for the Patriot Act to exploit.
III. THE SUBMAJORITARIAN FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment entrance test looks majori-
tarian in theory, asking what expectations of privacy society is willing to
protect.238 However, the Court has in some cases applied this test in a man-
ner that looks distinctly submajoritarian-allowing government discre-
tion to conduct surveillance under conditions that a majority of the public
would find unreasonable.239 Current Fourth Amendment law is consistent
only in its tendency to defer to the will of the elected branches.2 40 Since the
demise of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court has shown marked reluc-
tance to play any countermajoritarian role in its Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. The Court is unlikely to upset decisions made by legislative
bodies or policymakers about what searches and seizures are reasonable.2 4
1
Instead, the Court uses government-friendly balancing tests in an increas-
ing number of Fourth Amendment contexts. These balancing tests tend to
focus narrowly on the governmental claim of need on the one hand and
the nature and weight of the individual's interest on the other; they almost
invariably lead the Court to conclude that the former outweighs the latter.2 42
The value of the Fourth Amendment's procedural checks is not placed on
the scale. Any concerns about equality or the perspectives of minorities
are shoveled into the Equal Protection Clause, where they are unlikely to
prevail.2 43 The Fourth Amendment does not enjoy the judicial solicitude
proposed in Carolene Products's footnote 424 because the Court has not
articulated any fundamental privacy value for the judiciary to enforce, as
rights-based theories would entail, and has not regarded the Fourth Amend-
238 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra text accompanying notes 269-
272.
239 See infra text accompanying notes 275-292.
240 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Con-
stitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1989).
241 See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (holding that Ne-
vada's "stop and identify" statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (finding that warrantless arrests authorized by state law
do not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if for minor offenses punishable only by a fine).
242 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-65 (1995). In uphold-
ing the student drug testing program at issue on the ground that the school's interest in
stopping student drug use outweighed the students' privacy concerns, the Court essentially
replicated the school district's policymaking process.243 In his opinion for the Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996),
Justice Scalia deflected concerns about discriminatory enforcement to the Equal Protection
Clause, where the necessity of proving discriminatory intent rather than just impact im-
poses a virtually insurmountable burden on plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chavez v. I11. State Police,
251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment to law enforcement
officers on the ground that, as a matter of law, statistics showing disparity of enforcement
correlating with race did not demonstrate discriminatory intent).
244 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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ment as requiring consideration of the perspectives of minorities, as repre-
sentation-reinforcement theory might suggest. 245 The Fourth Amendment in
many respects has become an exception to any coherent theory of consti-
tutional interpretation.
A. Fourth Amendment Exceptionalism
The current Supreme Court is as comfortable with a countermajori-
tarian role in interpreting the scope of First Amendment protections as its
Warren Court predecessors. 246 Even if a majority of legislators wishes to
criminalize flag desecration or adopt broad measures to protect children
from viewing pornography on the Internet, the Court has been willing to find
popular legislation unconstitutional on the ground that it unduly limits
freedom of speech.247 This lack of deference is effectuated through doctrine
that puts a thumb on the scale in favor of the individual right at issue. The
classic First Amendment test does not simply balance the government inter-
est in preserving respect for the flag or protecting children against the value
of the speech.248 The government must show that its interest is compel-
ling, will actually be served by the measure it proposes, and cannot be
achieved by a less restrictive alternative that does not impinge on the in-
dividual's rights. 49
245 See infra text accompanying notes 320-324. Four Justices in Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 132-36 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) argued that the Court should
be more attentive to the perspective of racial minorities about the police and to empirical
evidence of discriminatory enforcement.
246 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional
Power and the Constitution: Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why
the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 83, 89-95 (2002)
(describing the existing Rehnquist Court as activist in the First Amendment field).
247 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (invalidating provisions of the Child
Online Protection Act ("COPA")); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating provi-
sions of the Communications Decency Act intended to protect children from viewing obscene
or indecent materials); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (finding state flag pro-
tection legislation a violation of the First Amendment); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310, 312 (1990) (finding similar federal legislation a violation of the First Amendment).
24i There is a vast literature on the propriety of using balancing tests to evaluate govern-
mental conduct that infringes on freedom of speech. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Dese-
cration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975) (arguing that in considering whether dan-
gerous messages may be proscribed, balancing tests "inevitably become intertwined with
the ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing-or if not that, at least with
the relative confidence or paranoia of the age in which they are doing it .... ); Laurent B.
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962) (arguing that bal-
ancing, as opposed to applying rules, tends to be overly deferential to the government or
popular prejudices).
249 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 701 ("As the Government bears the burden
of proof on the ultimate question of COPA's constitutionality, respondents must be deemed
likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that respondents' proposed less restric-
tive alternatives are less effective than COPA.").
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The Court has been far more uncertain about its role in interpreting
the Fourth Amendment. 2 ' The Warren Court made some key choices of di-
rection, none of which the current Court has actually overruled: First, the
governing clause of the Fourth Amendment is the Warrant Clause, not the
Reasonableness Clause. 25' Therefore, as a general matter, the central ques-
tion in a Fourth Amendment case is supposed to be not whether a search or
seizure is reasonable, but whether there is a sufficient justification for dis-
pensing with antecedent judicial review of the government's probable cause.
Second, the Warren Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment, 2 2 so part
of the Court's role is to nationalize a concept of when searches and seizures
are "unreasonable." Finally, the Warren Court adopted the exclusionary rule
as the chief remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. 253 Subsequent
Courts have shown tremendous ambivalence about two of these three deci-
sions. The current Court is highly skeptical of the value of antecedent judi-
cial review, often preferring to evaluate after the fact whether or not a search
or seizure was "reasonable, ' '25 4 and even more skeptical of the exclusion-
ary rule.255 The Court continues to honor national uniformity in its Fourth
Amendment interpretation, even if this means lowering the national floor.256
The Court's reluctance to find that the Fourth Amendment requires
antecedent judicial review (with the result that evidence might be excluded
in a criminal case if that requirement has not been met), combined with
the Court's tacit concerns about federalism and dislike of subjective con-
stitutional tests, has impeded the Court's ability to forge a coherent approach
to the Fourth Amendment. 2 7 The result is Fourth Amendment exception-
alism, in which constitutional doctrine is more deferential to the elected
250 See Craig Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468,
1468 (1985) (describing Fourth Amendment doctrine as "the Supreme Court's tar baby");
Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional
Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988) (commenting extensively on the Court's failure to develop
any coherent theory of constitutional interpretation in its Fourth Amendment case law).
251 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
252 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
253 See id.
214 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395-96 n.7 (1997) (analyzing whether or
not no-knock entry was reasonable without regard to the magistrate's prohibition of a no-
knock search in that case, and alluding to the fact that some states require officers executing a
warrant to seek permission for a no-knock search from a magistrate without even discuss-
ing imposing any such requirement).
255 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (adopting a cost-benefit analy-
sis in deciding not to apply the exclusionary rule in a particular context); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (same); John Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth
Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REV. 151
(1979).
256 As Justice Powell feared when he argued against the Warren Court's incorporation
test, Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring), the nation-
alization of the Fourth Amendment has led to a lowering of protections in the federal sys-
tem. See George C. Thomas, III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145 (2001) (advocat-
ing a return to greater Fourth Amendment protection against the federal government).
257 How the Court might proceed is discussed infra Part IV.
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branches and more internally inconsistent than other areas of Bill of Rights
interpretation."' The Court tacks wildly between rules and standards,25 9 be-
tween requirements of antecedent judicial review for probable cause and
post hoc judicial review for reasonableness. In its Fourth Amendment bal-
ancing tests, the Court does not inquire about or consider the existence of
less restrictive alternatives 260 and does not put any thumb on the scale for
individual rights. The government can easily pass such lenient tests. Because
of the Court's restrictive definition of what constitutes a "search" or "sei-
zure," in many cases the government does not have to pass any judicial
test at all, either before or after its investigations.26 '
The next Section will recount how the Court developed a submajori-
tarian view of what the Fourth Amendment requires in two areas relevant
to the Patriot Act provisions discussed above: (1) the scope of the Fourth
Amendment, which determines whether there are any constitutional con-
straints on gathering information held by third party custodians; and
(2) application of the Fourth Amendment to electronic surveillance in vari-
ous contexts, including foreign intelligence surveillance. In both these areas,
Congress has often been more protective of privacy than the Court's deci-
sions required. In the third area raised by the sample Patriot Act provisions
discussed-notice-Congress has had free rein for a different reason-the
relevant Supreme Court case law is underdeveloped.
B. Defining the Fourth Amendment
1. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Searches and Seizures
The first question in any review of the government's acquisition of
records and tangible things in a third party's custody is whether or not a
search is involved. If so, the Fourth Amendment will require that the gov-
ernment's conduct be reasonable. If not, the executive will have free rein
to search at will unless Congress decides to impose limits. The Supreme
Court's definition of the scope of the Fourth Amendment has fluctuated,
beginning with a formal and exclusionary definition of "searches and sei-
258 This phenomenon has hardly gone unnoticed. See Burkoff, supra note 255; Silas J.
Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257
(1984). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 240 (describing the Rehnquist Court's def-
erential approach in a variety of constitutional contexts).
259 Compare New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (creating a bright line rule cir-
cumscribing power to search vehicles incident to arrest to the passenger compartment and
containers therein), with Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004) (allowing search
incident to arrest of a "recent" occupant, defined in terms of temporal and spatial relation-
ship to the vehicle).
260 See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988).
26 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (holding that confronting
and questioning an individual on a bus was not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and so did not require any justification).
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zures" in a Prohibition era case, turning expansive during the 1960s and,
in the backlash of the 1970s, developing exceptions Congress found unac-
ceptable.
a. Olmstead and Congressional Reaction
The first time the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
electronic surveillance' of a suspect constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure, the Court answered the question in the broadest and most dismis-
sive manner possible. In 1928, the Court ruled in Olmstead v. United States
that the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of a right to be secure in one's "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects" only provided protection against searches
and seizures of tangible things. 262 Consequently, defendant Olmstead, the
subject of wiretapping by federal agents, did not have any Fourth Amend-
ment claim. Because the government's conduct fell outside the protection
of the Fourth Amendment, the question of whether the agents' conduct was
"reasonable," or whether the agents should have acquired a warrant be-
fore tapping Olmstead's phone, simply did not arise.
The formalistic opinion written by Chief Justice Taft on behalf of a
five Justice majority has not withstood the judgment of history. 263 It is
two of the dissenting opinions in Olmstead, written in eminently quotable
rhetoric by Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes, that
have been remembered for their articulation of a more court-oriented Fourth
Amendment philosophy-especially the Brandeis "right to be let alone. ' 26 4
But four decades passed before the Court finally overruled the holding of
Olmstead in Katz v. United States.265
During those four decades, the only limitations on the federal govern-
ment's authority to conduct electronic surveillance were derived from
statutes. In his opinion in Olmstead, Taft explicitly invited Congress to "pro-
tect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted,
inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation
.... 266 Congress accepted the invitation a few years later, providing in
262 77 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
263 See, e.g., James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835, 847-69 (1986)
(critiquing the opinion and its approach to constitutional interpretation).
264 "The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the [g]overnment, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
265 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra text accompanying notes 269-272.
266 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. Even before the Olmstead decision, there was precedent
for a legislative role; some state legislatures had limited their own state enforcement
officers' ability to intrude upon conversational privacy. In fact, in wiretapping Olmstead's
phone the federal agents violated a statute of the state in which they were operating (Wash-
ington) that made it a misdemeanor to "intercept" telegraph or telephone messages. See id.
at 468. The Court said that the state statute did not contain an exclusionary rule and so
evidence obtained as a result of a statutory violation would not be inadmissible under
common law, and that in any event the state could not delimit the use of evidence in a fed-
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the Federal Communications Act of 1934 that "no person not being au-
thorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person . "..."267 Politically account-
able actors provided more protection for a form of privacy that society
evidently was prepared to protect than did the politically insulated Supreme
Court.
2 68
b. Katz and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
In Katz v. United States, the Court announced that the Fourth Amend-
ment "protects people, not places." 69 Katz could reasonably expect pri-
vacy in his telephone conversation, the Court held, even if he was using a
public telephone booth. The conclusion that the agents' conduct in eaves-
dropping on Katz's conversation was after all a "search" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment did not, of course, mean that the wiretap was
impermissible-just that the Fourth Amendment's procedural requirements
applied, so the agents would presumably have to persuade a neutral and
detached magistrate that they had probable cause to believe Katz was com-
mitting a crime before they would be allowed to intercept his conversa-
tion.7 o
In overruling Olmstead, the Court ostensibly rejected that opinion's
narrow, formalistic, property-oriented approach to defining the Fourth
Amendment and instead declared that the Fourth Amendment protects "rea-
sonable expectations of privacy." '271 This decision provided an opportunity
for the Court to apply Fourth Amendment protection to more than prop-
erty rights already protected by legislatures. It was not long, however, before
the Court retreated. Instead of using Katz as a springboard to a meaningful
eral court. Id. at 469.
267 48 Stat. 1064, 1104 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000)). By 1967,
thirty-six states had also banned or regulated wiretapping. Of those, twenty-seven allowed
"authorized" interception by law enforcement under varying procedural conditions. See
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,48 n.5 (1967).
268 In addition to eliminating the Fourth Amendment as a potential source of constitu-
tional limitation on electronic surveillance, the Supreme Court also ruled out the possibil-
ity that a defendant might rely on the Due Process Clause to challenge evidence obtained
by electronic surveillance. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (distinguishing the
case of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which held that evidence obtained by
pumping a suspect's stomach was inadmissible because it had been obtained in a manner
shocking to the conscience). This meant that for four decades the courts played no role at
all in reviewing the constitutionality of electronic surveillance.
269389 U.S. at 351.
270 Katz did suggest that the rules might be different if a matter of national security
were involved. See id. at 362-64 (White, J., concurring).
17 Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). One prominent commentator recognized Katz
as essentially a tautology: The Court declared that something constituted a "search" if an
individual could reasonably expect to maintain it as private. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Per-
spectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974).
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judicial role, the Court adopted a counterintuitive and cramped definition of
what constitutes a "search," removing much governmental investigation
from the purview of the courts altogether.27 2
c. Obtaining Financial and Other Records from Third Party
Custodians: Miller and Congressional Reaction
Some post-Katz decisions adopted Olmstead's technique for addressing
government seizures of information held by third parties. These cases ruled
that this means of obtaining at least some forms of information, whether by
subpoena, request, or command, is not a "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Warren Court stalwarts Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan
thought Katz should have been interpreted as a self-conscious acceptance of
a role they believed the Fourth Amendment itself conferred on the judici-
ary. "By its terms, the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures assigns to the judiciary some prescriptive responsibility,"273
said Marshall. To decide when the Fourth Amendment imposes limitations
on the government's power to obtain information, a reviewing court must
evaluate the "intrinsic character" of the investigative practices at issue
with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth Amendment. When
the court finds "extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize [indi-
viduals'] sense of security," it should require "more than self-restraint"
on the part of law enforcement officers.2 74
In the decade following Katz, a majority of the Court rejected Mar-
shall's proposed normative approach and developed a limiting rule that
countered Katz's expansiveness: A person "has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. '275 One of
the clearest statements of this principle came in United States v. Miller,276
where the Court considered a defendant's contention that when the gov-
ernment acquired copies of his checks and other financial records from
his bank (under an allegedly defective subpoena duces tecum), that conduct
constituted a "search" or "seizure" and therefore should not have been per-
mitted in the absence of a court order. Miller argued that the bank was re-
172 1 am certainly not the first to notice the retreat from Katz. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note
71, at 825; Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications:
A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1557, 1577 (2004); Swire, supra note 34, at 907-11; see also Mell, supra note 189, at
380-406 (discussing post-Katz cases and concluding that "[tlhrough its interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has narrowed the legitimate sphere of the indi-
vidual's privacy in the attempt to balance the government's need to regulate activity and
the citizens' right to live free from government involvement").
273 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
274 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
275 Id. at 743.
276 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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quired to keep the records in question by the federal Bank Secrecy Act of
1970, and so the government had circumvented the orderly procedure of
the Fourth Amendment by first requiring the bank to maintain records and
then demanding that the records be turned over to the government. A
seven Justice majority declared that Miller had no legitimate expectation
of privacy and therefore no Fourth Amendment claim because he had volun-
tarily conveyed the information in question to the bank and thereby ex-
posed it to the bank employees.2 77 Earlier cases had held that one assumes
the risk that, in communicating any information to another person, that per-
son might choose to reveal it to the government, or might him or herself
be an undercover government agent.27 8
Congress, in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,279 reacted to
the dearth of protections for private financial information the Court left
after Miller. As with the legislative response to Katz, this procedural pro-
tection did not forbid government access to the information in question,
but rather required antecedent justification to preclude fishing expeditions
and arbitrary or discriminatory surveillance.280
Congress's decision that some procedural protection should be pro-
vided before the government can demand access to one's financial records
comports with an interesting empirical evaluation of the public's concern
about the privacy of bank records. Since the premise of the Katz test is
that society is prepared to protect some forms of privacy but not others,
Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher created a questionnaire to
test empirically whether the public would agree with the Supreme Court's
estimation of what society considers private.281 The study found perusal
277 Id. at 442-43. Justice Brennan argued that the majority was incorrect first in de-
scribing Miller's divulging his financial information to the bank as "volitional"-one must
share information with financial institutions in order to participate in the economic life of
contemporary society-and second in concluding that Miller had assumed the risk that the
bank would turn over his financial information to the government. Id. at 448, 451 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). The very question the Court was being asked to decide was what
Miller should be entitled to assume would remain private.27 8See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971) (holding that Katz did not
overrule this line of cases, which permitted the use of statements made to an undercover
agent as evidence).
279 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000). A response to Miller, this act was intended to pro-
tect customers of financial institutions from "unwarranted intrusion into their records while
at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement activity." H.R. REP. No. 95-1383,
at 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305-06. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3558 (discussing the need for legislative
protection of the privacy of electronic communications); M. Elizabeth Smith, The Public's
Need for Disclosure v. The Individual's Right to Financial Privacy: An Introduction to the
Financial Right to Privacy Act of 1978, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 529-33 (1980) (offering a
summary of the legislative history and the requirements of the Financial Privacy Act).
280 Holding that the target has no rights also removes a disincentive for violating the
privacy rights of information custodians. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980)
(holding that the target of a search did not have standing to challenge the flagrantly illegal
search of a bank officer's briefcase for the target's bank records).
281 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Pri-
vacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
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of bank records one area where those surveyed disagreed sharply with
the Court, rating such government activity as highly intrusive. 282
Instead of Marshall's inquiry into what forms of privacy the Court
should be prepared to protect, the Court chose to ask what forms of privacy
society was prepared to protect and then, evidently, provided answers incon-
sistent with those "society" itself would have provided.283 Although it pur-
ports to be majoritarian, the Katz test has been applied, at least in some
areas, in a distinctly submajoritarian manner. 28 4
d. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Orders: Smith and
Congressional Reaction
In Smith v. Maryland,285 the Court took the same approach it had
adopted in Miller in deciding that there is no "search" or "seizure" if the
government obtains records from the telephone company listing what tele-
phone numbers an individual has called (recorded by a pen register) or
from what telephone numbers an individual has received calls (trap and
trace). Quoting Miller, the majority announced that society was not prepared
to recognize any legitimate expectation of privacy here because Smith
had voluntarily exposed numerical information regarding his telephone
calls to the telephone company and therefore assumed the risk that the tele-
phone company would reveal that information to the government. 28 6 The
telephone company did not act voluntarily in Smith's case any more than
the bank had in Miller's,287 but under the post-Katz cases, as long as the in-
formation might have found its way to the government in another manner,
the government could force an unwilling custodian to divulge it.
This result was slightly more divisive than Miller, with three Justices
dissenting, including Justice Stewart, author of the Katz opinion.2 8 Add-
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993).
282 On a scale of I to 100, perusal of bank records showed a mean valuation for intru-
siveness of 71.60, with looking at foliage at a public park rating a mean of 6.48, searching
a bedroom an 85.23, and a body cavity search a 90.14. Id. at 738-39.
283 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?," 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 507-12 (2001) (finding the
Supreme Court's constitutional "reasonable expectation of privacy" diverges from the ac-
tual expectations of privacy of a reasonable person); Kerr, supra note 189, at 87; Mulligan,
supra note 272, at 1571-72 (describing a gap between society's actual expectations of privacy
and Fourth Amendment protections, as evidenced anecdotally by shocked reactions of
people on learning what the law allows).
284 The Court has found no reasonable expectation of privacy to exist even in cases
where the government acted in violation of laws protecting property. See infra note 349.
285 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
286 Id. at 744-45.
287 The police requested the telephone company install the pen register, but did not ob-
tain a warrant or court order. The Court considered this installation "state action." Id. at 737,
739 n.4.
288 Justice Powell did not participate in the decision, leaving a 5 to 3 split. Id. at 746-
47. Stewart, agreeing with Marshall, thought that the question should be not what Smith
could realistically expect, but what he should be entitled to assume. Id. at 747 (Stewart, J.,
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ing to the concerns raised in Miller, Justice Marshall's dissent criticized
the Court's all-or-nothing approach to the question of whether one gives
up all constitutional protection, even of the most confidential or personal
information, by sharing it with anyone under any conditions. "Privacy," he
wrote, "is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. ' '2 89
Congress reacted to the Court's decision not to provide any constitu-
tional protection for the privacy of telephone records, as it had with respect
to financial records, by enacting a statute providing procedural limitations
on the government's ability to seek pen register or trap and trace informa-
tion. 290 The statute requires a court order based on a government certification
that evidence relevant to a criminal investigation may be found.2 9 ' As with
wiretapping after Olmstead and financial privacy after Miller, the federal
statute provides procedural protections beyond those the Court found to
be constitutionally required, although less than what the Warrant Clause
would have mandated if the government's information gathering had been
found to constitute a "search. ' 292 The Court was evidently unwilling to de-
mand that the government secure a court order based on a showing of prob-
able cause before obtaining such records. With the Constitution out of the
picture, Congress was able to avoid the language of the Warrant Clause
by requiring a court order, but not one based on probable cause.
2. Title III and FISA: Berger, Keith, and Congressional Reaction
While Congress provided process that the Supreme Court had found
constitutionally superfluous in the areas described above, the respective
roles of Congress and the Court have been quite different in the area of
electronic surveillance. There, Congress sometimes follows the lead of the
Court, and sometimes leads a retreat from the Fourth Amendment para-
digm. 293 With respect to electronic surveillance in criminal investigations,
Congress responded to a Court decision threatening to derail electronic
surveillance by establishing extensive procedural safeguards with Title
III. In contrast, with respect to national security surveillance, the Supreme
Court explicitly invited Congress to formulate procedures legislatively,
hinting that whatever Congress worked out would be regarded as reason-
able and therefore constitutional. 294 The Supreme Court has never evalu-
ated whether Title III or the ever expanding realm under FISA succeed in
dissenting).
289 Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29 0 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000).
291 Id. § 3123.
292 Public opinion on this issue was not measured by the Slobogin and Schumacher
study. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 281, at 744.
293 See Solove, supra note 159, for an excellent account of the law relating to elec-
tronic surveillance.
294 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972).
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meeting the constitutional mark, but its lengthy silence functions as ap-
probation.29
5
a. Berger v. New York and Title III
Shortly before the Supreme Court actually overruled Olmstead, Ber-
ger v. New York 29 6 prodded Congress by invalidating a state statute per-
mitting electronic surveillance performed under court order. The New York
State Constitution, apparently in reaction to Olmstead, had provided explicit
constitutional protection against unreasonable electronic interceptions. 1
7
The New York legislature had accordingly included in its electronic sur-
veillance statute many of the procedural protections usually required by
the Fourth Amendment before the government may conduct a physical
search. 298 In a quintessential Warren Court opinion, the Court found that
the New York statute, although far exceeding federal constitutional ex-
pectations when it was passed, was nevertheless constitutionally deficient.
Justice Clark's opinion for the Court explained that the statute had not satis-
fied the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. 299 Some observ-
ers believed that the Berger opinion reflected a rooted Warren Court hos-
tility to the intrusive nature of electronic surveillance that might be im-
possible to overcome, no matter how many procedural protections a stat-
ute incorporated.3"
295 The Court has ruled on several applications of Title III without ever suggesting that
it might be unconstitutional. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (permitting
covert entry without explicit judicial permission in order to install surveillance equipment
authorized under Title III procedures); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (refus-
ing to find a wiretap unconstitutional despite the officer's subjective intent to disregard the
minimization requirement of Title III).
296 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
297 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (amended 1938).
291 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 813-a; Berger, 388 U.S. at 43 n.. To conduct such surveil-
lance, a state agent was required to obtain a court order based on a showing that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a crime might be obtained-i.e., individual-
ized suspicion and antecedent judicial review.
299 Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-56. The Fourth Amendment requirement that any search
warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized," U.S. CONST. amend. IV, was breached because the order did not specify what crime
was being investigated or what conversations were to be overheard, and permitted surveil-
lance for up to sixty days in what the Court described as a "series" of intrusions. Berger,
388 U.S. at 59.
300 Two concurring Justices would have gone further than the majority. Justice William
Douglas spoke of electronic surveillance as placing an "invisible policeman" in a home or
office on the basis of what amounted to a general warrant. Berger, 388 U.S. at 65 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart thought the standard of reasonableness required by the Fourth
Amendment should be calibrated to the level of intrusion involved, maintaining that while
probable cause might be enough to justify a conventional search or arrest, a higher level of
justification should be required before allowing "an intrusion of the scope and duration
that was permitted in this case." Id. at 70 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Congress reacted to the Berger and Katz decisions by formulating
wiretapping rules designed to meet the Court's objections in Berger."' The
Supreme Court had effectively raised the Fourth Amendment bar, and Con-
gress responded by providing a measure of procedural protection that may
even have exceeded what the Court would have found to be constitution-
ally required.
b. Keith and FISA
President Richard Nixon's claim that he had inherent authority to con-
duct surveillance of domestic dissidents without prior judicial approval
was rejected by the Supreme Court in Keith,"2 but the Court left room for
a claim of executive authority to conduct surveillance of non-citizen "for-
eign powers" in the interest of national security, possibly without prior
judicial approval.3"3
It was not only the Justices who were skeptical of the broad claim of
executive branch discretion to conduct national security wiretaps. In 1976,
the Church Commission, investigating complaints that President Nixon
had abused his claimed surveillance powers, concluded that "[u]nless new
and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence
activities threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally
alter its nature."3" Nixon had authorized the FBI's COINTELPRO, which
wiretapped Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other dissidents and anti-war
protestors, often choosing targets solely on the basis of their political activi-
ties.3 °5 The Church Commission's work led to the enactment of FISA,
which represented a compromise between the claims of inherent execu-
tive authority to conduct electronic surveillance in the absence of judicial
authorization and concerns about allowing the executive branch this po-
tentially vast and dangerous power.3"6
301 See supra note 57, describing Title III.
302 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). The Court believed
that both First Amendment and Fourth Amendment values were jeopardized by the possi-
bility of such unconstrained executive discretion to wiretap. See id. at 314.
303 Id. at 321-23. The Keith Court rejected the government's argument that requiring
prior judicial approval for such national security wiretaps would obstruct the government's
investigative efforts. The Court disagreed with the government that, first, the courts would
not be sufficiently expert to evaluate the government's reasons for wanting to conduct sur-
veillance. If the government was unable to explain to a court why it wished to conduct
surveillance, the Court said, perhaps that was a sign that there was not sufficient justification
for such intrusive surveillance. Id. at 320. The Court also rejected the argument that prior
judicial approval would compromise the need for secrecy in such investigations, noting
that proceedings could be conducted ex parte and in camera if required. Id. at 320-21.
304 SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTEL-
LIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS (BOOK
II), S. REP. 94-755, at 2 (1976).
305 Id.
306 FISA, as originally enacted, allowed the Attorney General to authorize electronic
surveillance without a court order only if the surveillance is directed at "foreign powers,"
2006] Patriot Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment 117
The original FISA compromise came close to the Title III Fourth
Amendment paradigm. Since then, Congress has continually expanded the
reach of FISA and reduced its procedural protections. °7 The Supreme Court
has never reviewed the constitutionality of FISA, perhaps because, as is
evidently the case with Title III, it is satisfied with this legislative response.
This lack of review is another form of deference to the elected branches.
The Keith balancing test, as applied by the FISCR court,3"8 allowed Con-
gress to decide what check on executive discretion is necessary. Instead
of following the Warrant Clause approach, which provides a judicial check
on executive branch searches, the FISCR court's version of the reason-
ableness approach permits Congress to adjust the relative roles of the
executive branch and the courts.
3. Notice and the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court has been slow in developing the idea that the
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness includes a presumption
in favor of notice. It was not until 1995 that the Court found no-knock
searches to be presumptively unconstitutional on the basis of what was said
to have been the rule at common law.3"9 Additionally, search warrants are
frequently executed in homes, a venue whose privacy the Court is inclined
to esteem."' The Court recently found a search to have been invalidly exe-
cuted when the search warrant did not on its face provide notice of the
scope of the search, even though the scope had been circumscribed in other
documents.3 '
50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000), and there is "no substantial likelihood that the sur-
veillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person
is a party," id. § 1802(a)(l)(B). To receive a court order to conduct surveillance of a "United
States person," id. § 1801(i) (defined as a United States citizen, an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, or certain associations or corporations), the Attorney General was
required to certify that the target was a "foreign power or agent of a foreign power," a
finding that was not permitted to be made "solely on the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A). Under the
definition in FISA prior to the Patriot Act amendment, a United States person could be
considered an "agent of a foreign power" if the person: knowingly engaged in potentially
illegal clandestine intelligence gathering activities for a foreign power; knowingly engaged
in sabotage, international terrorism, or activities in preparation therefore on behalf of a
foreign power; knowingly entered the United States under a false or fraudulent identity on
behalf of a foreign power or later assumed such an identity; or knowingly aided or abetted
any of the conduct described. Id. § 1801(b)(2). The Patriot Act eliminated the required
nexus to a foreign power in some contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 45-53. For
a fuller account of the development of FISA, see Swire, supra note 47, at 1310-26.
307 See supra note 156.
308 See supra text accompanying notes 177-181.
3° See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). Compare id., with Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963) (leaving open the question of whether the Constitution
requires notice of a search).
310 See supra note 201.
"I Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
The Supreme Court has, thus far, left the question of deferred noti-
fication to the lower courts and Congress. Section 213 does provide a role
for the judiciary in deciding when to authorize deferred notification, so
while the provision leaves open the significant question of what standard
to apply, at least there is antecedent judicial participation in deferral de-
cisions.
IV. RESTORING FOURTH AMENDMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW
Those who believe that the Patriot Act strikes a sound balance are not
likely to object either to the reluctance of Congress to amend its provi-
sions more extensively or to the obstacle Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
poses to meaningful judicial review. Even those who harbor concerns about
whether the surveillance provisions go "too far" may argue that the respon-
sibility for striking the balance lies with Congress rather than the Court.
Orin Kerr, for example, notes that Congress has frequently exceeded the
Court's constitutional floor312 and concludes that the question of whether
surveillance statutes are constitutional is actually a distraction from the pol-
icy questions that Congress, the superior decision-maker, should be mak-
ing.313 Others argue that meaningful judicial review is dispensable because
congressional oversight will be more effective in uncovering and check-
ing executive abuses.3"4
In many respects, Congress is indeed a superior policymaker when it
comes to striking the balance of what is reasonable-it can consider more
than individual cases, it can demand that information, even classified infor-
mation, be regularly shared in connection with its oversight authority, it is
free from government control of the timing and contours of litigation in
criminal cases, and it can reflect public opinion about what is reasonable.3' 5
Kerr's account, however, underestimates the need for judicial involvement in
several respects. First, as Peter Swire has observed,316 Congress's most
generous procedural protections of privacy have often been inspired by the
stimulus of a Supreme Court decision, as happened after both Berger and
Keith. This pattern is unlikely to recur if the Court does not take an active
role in reviewing executive surveillance powers.317 Swire provides a com-
312 Kerr, supra note 71, at 806, 839-57.
"I See id. at 858-82 (describing institutional advantages of legislative decision-
making, especially concerning procedures to govern surveillance using new technologies).
314 See, e.g., Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Developments: USA PATRIOT Act, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 435, 453 (2002) (concluding that if the executive branch uses its sur-
veillance powers wisely and Congress provides oversight, the Patriot Act powers will not
pose a problem).
35 See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 250, at 47-50 (attributing the Supreme
Court's earlier reluctance to employ balancing tests to the Court's understanding of its own
lack of competence to explain how it is assessing the relative values).
316 Swire, supra note 34, at 915-19.
317 Id.
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pelling explanation of why Congress will tend, over time, to expand gov-
ernment surveillance authority-a phenomenon he describes as "ratcheting
up."3" 8 Expansions of surveillance authority adopted in a time of emergency
tend to become permanent and to set a new standard of what is acceptable.3" 9
Swire also recognizes that the Court has a unique countermajoritarian
role to play in reviewing the reasonableness of legislatively authorized
surveillance practices.3 20 Majority opinion that a practice is unreasonable
should usually lead to or parallel the conclusion that the practice violates
the Fourth Amendment, but the Fourth Amendment floor should not also
be its ceiling. John Ely, one of the principal architects of representation-
reinforcement theory, suggests that the Fourth Amendment should be
viewed as a necessary means of protecting the rights of minorities.3 2' One
of the most unfortunate aspects of the Supreme Court's abdication in this
area is the Court's refusal to consider the potential for discriminatory
enforcement as a significant part of its Fourth Amendment review. 22 In the
areas in which the Patriot Act surveillance powers operate, the potential
for unequal or biased enforcement creates a particular need for politically
insulated review of otherwise invisible search and seizure authority granted
to the government.3 23 Even if a majority of Americans were willing to sacri-
fice the privacy of Arab and Muslim men, the presumed targets of much of
the government's attention, that does not make a discriminatory search pol-
icy reasonable.3 24
I believe that the Patriot Act provisions described should be subjected
to more rigorous judicial review than current Fourth Amendment law is
"I Id.; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 240, at 84 (observing that the legislature
rarely strengthens Fourth Amendment protections); Swire, supra note 47, at 1348-50 (at-
tributing this effect to, inter alia, the gap between short- and long-term preferences and the
role of the Justice Department in proposing changes in legislation).
3 19 See William Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, lll YALE L.J. 2137, 2181
(2002) (predicting that states are likely to follow expansions in federal surveillance author-
ity by amending their own laws to provide comparable powers).
320 Swire, supra note 34, at 922-23.
31 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 172-73 (1980) (arguing that the
Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements may be viewed as methods of
preventing discriminatory use of the search and seizure power). But see Wasserstrom & Seid-
man, supra note 250, at 93-94, for a critique of Ely's approach.
322 See supra note 243.
323 See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-
9/11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS 170, 192 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds.,
2003) (arguing that the courts are needed to enforce the liberties of discrete and insular
minorities in defining what constitutes impermissible racial profiling).324 See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREE-
DOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 1-21, 183-208 (2003) (arguing against double standards
and willingness to sacrifice the liberty of Arab and Muslim men in order to promote "our"
security); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002) (discussing racial profiling in the context of anti-terrorism
investigations); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress
and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12 (2001); White-
head & Aden, supra note 18, at 1094-95 (describing how Patriot Act provisions and other
government policies show a lack of concern for the rights of non-citizens).
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likely to provide. This Section will discuss what form that review might
take and how the Court might forge a new partnership with Congress and
the state legislatures in evaluating when searches and seizures are reason-
able.
A. Sections 215 and 505 and the Katz Test
Miller and Smith, broadly read, would lead to the conclusion that ob-
taining any of the records covered by section 215 or 505 does not implicate
any constitutional rights of targets, who therefore would not be entitled
to any antecedent judicial review. Several commentators, including Patricia
Bellia and Deirdre Mulligan, have offered powerful arguments for distin-
guishing Miller and Smith in the context of the Internet.2 5 The earlier dis-
cussion of the reactions to section 215326 shows that many members of the
public and Congress view libraries as a special venue that should be enti-
tled to greater protection than other institutions and businesses covered
by section 215. It is plausible that the Court might distinguish Miller and
Smith and find a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to some of
the records subject to acquisition under section 215, perhaps on the ground
that specially protected areas are involved327-areas implicating First
Amendment freedoms, like activity on the Internet or in libraries.3 28
Instead of asking only what exceptions there might be to the Miller!
Smith test, the Court should renovate its approach to defining the scope of
the Fourth Amendment by embarking on the three step program described
321 Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1375, 1397-1403 (2004) (arguing that a broad reading of Miller, in the context of the
Internet, is inconsistent with Katz); Mulligan, supra note 272, at 1577-82 (arguing for
limiting the theory of Miller and Smith, described as undermining the promise of Katz, and
for upgrading procedural protection under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act);
see also Madrifian, supra note 41, at 806-12 (arguing that Smith is distinguishable in the
context of the Internet).
Other commentators have noted how emerging technologies-both surveillance tech-
nology and communications technology-have challenged the Court's doctrinal framework.
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 123-41 (2002) (applying Katz, Kyllo,
and Smith to searches of e-mail, including the use of Carnivore technology); Raymond
Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Techno-
logical Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1350-68 (2002) (arguing that in light of
Kyllo, what constitutes a search should depend on the technology involved) Ric Simmons,
From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Cen-
tury Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1343 (2002); see also Bellia, supra, at 1379
nn.15-16, 1457 n.414 (regarding evaluation of ECPA), 1441-48 (deploring paucity of good
Internet law scholarship as well as effective Internet law).
326 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8, 10, 84-89.
327 Ironically, this is very similar to the type of reasoning Katz declared it was replac-
ing. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347, 350 (1967) (declining to accept question
presented as whether Katz was in a "constitutionally protected area").
328 See supra text accompanying notes 131-138 for Judge Marrero's views on the rela-
tionship of First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights of Internet service providers
and their customers.
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below. This is just a sketch of what such a program might entail, as
fleshing out an entire theory of the Fourth Amendment is beyond the scope
of this Article. By whatever avenue, my goal is to encourage the courts to
play some meaningful role in evaluating the reasonableness of govern-
ment surveillance.
1. Reconceptualize the Relationship Between the Warrant Clause
and Reasonableness
It sometimes seems that the current Court only actually believes in the
primacy of the Warrant Clause (other than with respect to physical searches
of a home) when it is trying to avoid its implications.32 9 The submajori-
tarian decisions in Miller and Smith can best be explained as exposing the
Court's reluctance to live with the consequences of continuing to hold that
the Warrant Clause dominates the Fourth Amendment. Finding that req-
uisitioning records is a "search" would have led, under current doctrine,
to a holding that top tier antecedent review based on probable cause is
required before the government may compel third parties to turn over
such records.330 The language of the Warrant Clause specifies that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause," '331 so finding that a search
is involved leads, under current theory, to a warrant requirement and to the
probable cause standard. Congress decided in the legislation reacting to
Miller and Smith, as well as in section 215, that the government must seek a
court order before obtaining certain records. However, Congress provided
standards of review less rigorous than probable cause. Some federal stat-
utes merely require the government to provide the court with a certification;
others require the court to play an active role in reviewing whether the sur-
veillance would be reasonable under some standard less rigorous than prob-
able cause.33 To allow this flexibility, the Court had to find the Fourth
Amendment inapplicable. Thus, the Court plays no role in reviewing which
of these standards is appropriate, and plays no role if Congress decides to
eliminate antecedent review altogether, as it essentially did in section 505.
Justice Scalia and others have advocated333 that the Court should re-
gard the Reasonableness Clause as dominating Fourth Amendment analy-
329 See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General Reasonableness In-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119 (1989) (commenting on
the Court's negative view of the Warrant Clause).
330 Such a finding could also lead, of course, to the exclusion of evidence in a criminal
prosecution. It is impossible to overestimate the influence of the exclusionary rule on the
Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
332 The standard the Senate proposed for section 215, for example, would charge the
court with evaluating whether relevant information is likely to be obtained and whether a
sufficient nexus to terrorism exists. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005, S. 1389, 109th Cong. § 7(a)(1) (2005).
13 See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (de-
claring that the Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches
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sis334 because they wish to avoid the warrant requirement.3 35 The ideal of
antecedent judicial review should not be so lightly discarded.336 Attempts
to litigate the constitutionality of the Patriot Act provisions show some of
the difficulties inherent in post hoc review for reasonableness. "Reason-
able," however, need not always connote post hoc judicial review. A "rea-
sonable" search, in my view, would still presumptively be preceded by some
form of judicial review where neutral and detached magistrates would
play some role in evaluating whether or not the search should take place.
Truly recognizing the preference for warrants as one aspect of an over-
arching reasonableness inquiry might allow the Court to provide some
form of judicial review in circumstances where it now provides none. This
might include requiring the government to show a lesser quantum of in-
dividualized suspicion than probable cause as a precondition to the acquisi-
tion of sensitive records. The standard of reasonableness could become
an umbrella for more particular questions about what rules should be ap-
plied, including the precise nature of the showing required to obtain a
court order.
2. Reform the Katz Test
The Court established a majoritarian minimum in the Katz test, but
lowered the Fourth Amendment standard below this floor when it adopted
an exaggerated notion of assumption of risk that does not comport with
society's actual expectations. There have been many interesting sugges-
tions for how reasonable expectations of privacy could be redefined. Sherry
Colb, for example, argues that the Fourth Amendment threshold should be
and seizures, but merely prohibits searches and seizures that are "unreasonable"). Some
commentators argue that Scalia's preference for the reasonableness inquiry is historically
well founded. See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
38-44 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV.
757, 759 (1994). Others maintain that the Warren Court's interpretation is correct. See
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547,
591-619 (1999) (citing the widespread opposition to allowing officers to exercise discre-
tionary search authority and the fact that "reasonableness was not used as a standard for
assessing searches or arrests in framing-era legal sources").
334 Many commentators argue that this has already occurred in practice even if not in
theory. See Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Jus-
tice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1024 (2001) (arguing that Justice
Scalia's preference has largely been honored by the Court); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth
Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1744 (2000) (noting Scalia's
influence on Fourth Amendment law); see also Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the
Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 928 (1997) (observing that
the Rehnquist Court favors a reasonableness interpretation); Wasserstrom, supra note 329.
"I Critics have different reasons for their willingness to dispense with antecedent judi-
cial review. See, e.g., Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 250, at 27-35 (critiquing the war-
rant requirement as an ineffectual rubber stamp).336 See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV.
820, 825, 846-56 (1994) (defending the current preference for warrants and challenging
the wisdom and feasibility of Akhil Amar's alternative proposals).
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lowered substantially, and that reasonable expectations of privacy should
merit some form of protection unless an individual may be deemed to have
essentially consented to a search.337
I do not argue that the Court should define the scope of the Fourth
Amendment on the basis of public opinion polls, but I do think that a more
generous definition of what the Fourth Amendment requires is necessary.
There are several different ways the Court might approach the question of
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. In the approach advocated by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, the Court would shoulder the responsibility
of deciding what the public has the right to expect by defining the values
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. It is unimaginable that the current
Supreme Court will adopt such an avowedly normative approach.338
The alternative must be some sort of positivist33 9 test. Justice An-
tonin Scalia's brand of originalism has provided a new positivist gloss on
the Katz test. The reconstructed views of the framers are taken as an ob-
jective measure of Fourth Amendment values. In the recent Kyllo case, 34°
the Court was willing to find that the government's use of a particular tech-
nology was a "search" even though that conclusion led to imposition of a
warrant requirement. Scalia's opinion for the Court held that the use of a
thermal imaging device was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because the device gathered information (about heat levels)
from inside a home that would not have been available in the day of the
framers without a physical entry into the home.34" ' The Court's pro-warrant
decision in Kyllo occurred in the context of a decision about the privacy
of the home, a privileged venue in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and may not extend beyond that context. 342 Nevertheless,
Kyllo shows that the Court has some interest in forging a role for itself in
checking executive discretion to use surveillance technology rather than
delegating that job entirely to legislatures.3 43 Originalism is an unpredict-
"I See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002) (arguing that risk-
taking does not always invite exposure, and that limited exposure does not always invite
universal exposure).
"I I am sympathetic to the argument that the Court cannot make sense of the Fourth
Amendment without owning values choices. See Chemerinsky, supra note 240, at 74-87;
see also Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 250, at 105 (concluding after extensive
analysis that the difficulty of defining either norms or a satisfying positivist theory should
not eliminate a meaningful judicial role).
339 For a good working definition of what I mean by "positivism," see Wasserstrom &
Seidman, supra note 250, at 67 (defining constitutional positivism as "forsak[ing] the goal
of standing outside of current preferences and assum[ing], instead that the Constitution is
embodied in the fair expression of those preferences").
340 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
341 Id. at 34-35.
342 The decision is also limited to technologies not in "public use." See id. at 34.
343 See Kerr, supra note 71, at 802-05 (describing Kyllo as reflecting the "prevailing
view" that the courts should have primary responsibility for deciding when the use of tech-
nology in surveillance is reasonable).
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able basis for evaluating new technologies, but it does provide some plat-
form for an independent judicial role in deciding when the Fourth Amend-
ment will apply.
3. Adopt a Positivist Hybrid Rights Approach to Defining
Reasonableness
Another alternative would borrow from the Court's approach to de-
fining other constitutional standards. In other areas of Bill of Rights interpre-
tation, the Court has constructed a two step positivist doctrine that attempts
to avoid highly subjective judicial standards and to preserve some democ-
ratic choice about the scope of rights-a hybrid rights approach.3" Proce-
dural due process doctrine provides the best example. Justices Brennan and
Marshall had proposed that the Court adopt a normative approach in
defining what process is due, arguing that the Supreme Court should in-
sist that the government provide case-appropriate process wherever the gov-
ernment threatens an individual with a "grievous loss" of property3 45 or
liberty.3 46 This assertive judicial posture is comparable to the role the same
Justices proposed for courts wielding the Katz test. Instead, a majority of
the Supreme Court adopted a more judicially modest bifurcated approach
to procedural due process, asking first if state or federal law has created
an entitlement to the form of property or liberty in question and, only if the
answer to that threshold question is yes, going on to consider what proc-
ess is due to protect that entitlement.3 47 Society, through its lawmakers,
decides what interests are worth protecting, and the Court then decides what
procedures will provide adequate protection for the favored interests.
In its Fourth Amendment cases, however, the Court has thus far rejected
such positivist approaches.3 48 The Court does not look to property law as
344 See Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of
Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984) [hereinafter
Herman, The New Liberty] (describing and critiquing positivist due process doctrine as
applied to prisoners' liberty interests); Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You Want a Revolution?, 87 IowA L. REV. 615, 635-40 (2002)
(describing a hybrid rights approach applied in interpreting Bill of Rights guarantees and
discussing the possible application to sentencing guidelines).
345 See Bd. of Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)).
346 See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229-30 (1976).
341 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. The courts make the second stage decision-what process is
due-under a three factor balancing test that is unaffected by any decisions the legislature
may have made about what process should be due. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Louder-
mill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
348 Justice Scalia, who is not shy about exercising judicial independence, dislikes the
hybrid rights approach. He has unequivocally rejected the idea of referring to local law as
a baseline in Fourth Amendment interpretation because it would lead to varying results
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-
16 (1996), Scalia's opinion for the Court declined to consider whether or not an officer
conducting a stop was acting beyond his authority under the law of the District of Colum-
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a baseline for evaluating what society expects to remain private.149 Katz
criticized the Olmstead approach of making property rights the ceiling of
Fourth Amendment protection.350 Under current doctrine, property rights
are not even a floor.351
Some version of the hybrid rights approach might be adapted to Fourth
Amendment analysis of what constitutes a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" and help the Court avoid setting the Fourth Amendment bar too low.
Such an inquiry might well provide a narrower definition than what I think
the Katz test should offer, but it might also prove more attractive to a Court
concerned about making countermajoritarian values choices. The entitle-
ments inquiry of the procedural due process doctrine is not directly trans-
ferable, but it offers a model of how the threshold Fourth Amendment in-
quiry could be bifurcated.352 The Court could consider first whether legisla-
tion (perhaps legislation throughout the country) or other evidence of soci-
ety's opinions suggests that the people expect a particular form of pri-
vacy to be respected.353 Legislation protecting a particular interest, like
the Financial Privacy Act and its state counterparts, or trespass laws cre-
ating property rights, is a more objective referent than the Court's own
subjective guess of which interests society is prepared to protect.
After concluding that a particular form of surveillance should be meas-
ured against Fourth Amendment norms, an inquiry that should not be too
bia.
349 See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that police entry and
examination of a field is not a search under the definition of Katz because the expectation
of privacy in such fields is not "legitimate" and does not infringe upon the personal and
social values protected by the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the police entry vio-
lated state trespass law).
Part of the Court's reluctance to regard property law as providing a Fourth Amend-
ment floor may be ascribed to the variation in state laws. In California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988), the Court found that police acquisition from trash collectors of bags of
trash left for collection was not a "search." In response to respondent's argument that Cali-
fornia state law recognized a right to privacy in garbage, the Court characterized this ar-
gument as "no less than a suggestion that concepts of privacy under the laws of each State
are to determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment. We do not accept this submission."
Id. at 44. Note that the Court's approach-declining to consider this conduct a search-
also results in regulation of this conduct varying from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, although
not in the name of the United States Constitution.
350 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967) (stating that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places").
"I Orin Kerr concludes that, in its post-Katz cases, the Court has returned to interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment as protecting property rights. See Kerr, supra note 71, at 809-
37. However, as Peter Swire notes, the Court frequently does not even interpret the Fourth
Amendment to protect property rights if that result would disadvantage the government.
See Swire, supra note 34, at 905-10.
352 With respect to new technologies, commentators seem very much divided about
where privacy may reasonably be expected. See Kerr, supra note 71, at 808 (observing that
"no one knows whether an expectation of privacy in a new technology is 'reasonable"').
"I While I have criticized this approach to assessing the value of prisoners' freedom,
see Herman, The New Liberty, supra note 344, at 543-74, there would presumably be
greater accountability in political decisions defining property rights and the value of pri-
vacy that all will share than in defining the value of a prisoner's interest in freedom.
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restrictive, the Court could then preserve to itself the second stage deci-
sion about what procedural protections should accompany those expecta-
tions. This could include what showing the government should have to make
and what role the courts should play in reviewing the government's use of
that technique in a particular case. This is a more limited procedural task
than the Brennan/Marshall approach, comparable to what the Court does
in deciding what process is due to protect entitlements created by legisla-
tive or executive action.35
4
The second stage of the due process test is the most helpful analogy
in the Fourth Amendment area because it stresses the unique ability and
responsibility of the courts to decide what procedures are appropriate even
where the 'Court is reluctant to select the values to be protected. But the
clarity of judicial role in the second step will be unavailing if the Court
rarely finds values to protect in the first step. The procedural due process
analogy is not very tight in this first step inquiry, precisely for the reason
judicial review is needed: legislatures may not wish to constrain execu-
tive branch discretion to search and seize in many circumstances. So in-
stead of the narrow focus of the procedural due process cases on the wording
of statutes and regulations, the Court might adopt an eclectic approach in
defining when society reasonably expects privacy, like the approach it has
recently used in the Eighth Amendment area to determine what punish-
ments society deems cruel and unusual.355 A majority of the Court in re-
cent death penalty cases has looked to trends in legislation around the coun-
try, the views of professional associations, and international and even
foreign law in attempting to derive an objective measure of what our evolv-
ing standards of decency demand. 5 6 The Fourth Amendment's benchmark
of reasonableness seems to invite a comparable approach-trying to identify
what "the people" consider "unreasonable."
Adopting a hybrid rights approach would have the advantage of rec-
ognizing legislatures as partners in developing appropriate constraints for
executive action, rather than either the target of the Court's Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny or the sole defender of privacy values. The Fourth Amendment
is not the only area where legislative decisions are not at the core of the
problem the Constitution addresses. In Missouri v. Hunter,357 for example,
the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause constrains state or federal
prosecutors who decide what prosecutions to bring, but does not limit legis-
lators who decide how to define crimes. If legislatures define overlapping
I" See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), where the Court, after finding that a
liberty or property interest exists, weighs what process is due under a multi-factor balanc-
ing test.
355 See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
356 See Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191-94 (examining trends in the states), 1198-1200 (looking
at international and foreign law); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-17, 321.
357459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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crimes, that does not in itself do any harm. It is only if prosecutors use re-
dundant statutes to prosecute the same individual that double jeopardy con-
cerns are triggered. Similarly, constraining executive discretion to search
and seize is the main task of the Fourth Amendment. The problem with
the Patriot Act provisions is not that Congress itself is violating any rights.
Rather, the Patriot Act provisions raise concerns about threats to our consti-
tutional values to the extent that they fail to provide for the kinds of re-
straints on executive discretion to search that the courts could and should
be providing themselves through constitutional law.
The Court could conclude that Congress' inclusion of some form of
antecedent review in section 215 suggests that a reasonable expectation of
privacy does exist with respect to library and medical records. Upon hav-
ing found that this form of governmental surveillance is a form of activity
the Fourth Amendment governs, the Court would make an independent
judgment, as in the second stage of procedural due process cases, about
what procedures the reasonableness standard requires. Total deference to
Congress on that second question would be no more appropriate than total
deference to legislatures on the question of what procedures should be
provided when a form of liberty or property is at stake.358 But a level of flexi-
bility in deciding what procedures are reasonable, added to freedom from
the automatic assumption that antecedent judicial review requires a showing
of probable cause, might lead the Court to play some role other than sim-
ply deferring to Congress.
B. Section 218 and Reasonableness
If courts are assessing the reasonableness of certain forms of gov-
ernment surveillance, they must ask more nuanced questions than whether
the need for security outweighs individual privacy interests. Courts are
required to evaluate the constitutionality of government investigations au-
thorized by section 218, because the option of holding that electronic
surveillance is not a "search" died with Olmstead. Under a classic War-
rant Clause approach, an electronic surveillance warrant may not be issued
in the absence of classic probable cause and so the FISA-based provi-
sions of section 218 would be unconstitutional. Relying on the Supreme
Court's invitation in Keith, however, the FISCR used an open-ended bal-
ancing test to decide whether searches under section 218 are "reason-
able," declining to follow the Supreme Court's administrative search cases,
which offer a more concrete approach to examining the reasonableness of
a government "search" not governed by the Warrant Clause.359 The court
358 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that a court
must make its own decision about what process is due after finding the existence of a prop-
erty interest).359 See supra text accompanying notes 173-18 1. Whether the FISCR was right to use a
freewheeling balancing test rather than the administrative search doctrine is the subject of
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treated the issue of reasonableness as a seesaw battle between the demands
of privacy and of national security.
In a pitched battle with security, whether in Congress or the courts,
Fourth Amendment claims of a right to privacy will lose. The government
alleges that information gained and shared under section 218 will help to
ensure our safety and that the incremental loss of privacy entailed is not
great relative to the pre-Patriot Act status quo. 360 It is impossible for us to
know whether any terrorist or other criminal actually has been or will be
caught through the use of a particular power,361 or to evaluate whether other
apprehension techniques could have been used that impinge less on civil
liberties. On the benefit side of the balance, therefore, is the unquantifiable
possibility that a particular surveillance technique might be useful in avert-
ing what might be great harm. On the other side is an unquantifiable list
of costs. As we do not know how extensively the government has used the
provisions in question, we cannot measure how much privacy has been for-
feited or whether the power conferred has been used in a discriminatory
fashion. The breadth of the Patriot Act's net imposes some costs even if
the Act's powers are never used, such as the chilling effect created by the
potential use of these powers and the fear of Arabs and Muslims that they
are being targeted. It is impossible to quantify and weigh these costs
against the government's assertion that it needs to add particular tools to
its security arsenal.
Casting the decision as a stark balance also misstates the nature of
the issues raised by these sections of the Patriot Act. The constitutional ar-
gument made by most critics is not that anything should be immune from
government scrutiny, but is rather about judicial role and procedure: what
antecedent justification the government must show before engaging in
certain kinds of surveillance, when and to whom notice must be provided,
how broad the veil of secrecy should be, and how extensive or minimal a
role the courts are to play. Marc Rotenberg has aptly observed that the lib-
erty versus security question tends to divert attention from the critical analy-
sis of how much secrecy and lack of accountability we are willing to tol-
erate in the government's use of its surveillance powers.362 It is a different
the FISCR decision and the heavily critical commentary on that court's analysis. See supra
note 189.
36o See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 120.
361 Perhaps because its aim has been prevention, the government has prosecuted rela-
tively few terrorism suspects since September 11. See TRAC REPORTS, A SPECIAL TRAC
REPORT: CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AGAINST TERRORISTS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
terrorism/report0l 1203.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
362 Marc Rotenberg, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Foreword: Privacy and Secrecy
After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2002). Rotenberg argues that liberty and security
are complementary rather than warring values, id. at 1126-27, disagreeing with the balanc-
ing approach advocated by Amitai Etzioni. See AMITAI ETZIONI, How PATRIOTIC IS THE
PATRIOT ACT: FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM (Routledge 2004) (ap-
plying a balancing approach and concluding the Patriot Act is a reasonable protection of
security).
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question to ask not whether a particular form of surveillance is useful or
even necessary, but whether the government should have the discretion to
decide whether to search without any judicial review.
Fourth Amendment exceptionalism, as described above,3 63 has led the
Court to ignore what it knows in other areas of constitutional analysis:
Generalized balancing tests stack the deck against claims of individual
rights. 3 4 For that reason, First Amendment balancing tests carefully cali-
brate standards of review and burdens of proof, including the burden on
the government to show that no less restrictive alternative is available. I
do not believe that the courts will or should transplant the model of First
Amendment analysis to the Fourth Amendment. Although the Fourth
Amendment is some kind of right, it is not the same kind of right as the
First Amendment. However, I do believe that balancing tests examining
what is reasonable should evaluate more than the "promote security" vs.
"limit liberty" choice pollsters pose. Any Fourth Amendment balancing test
should be more considerate not only of the costs of surveillance to indi-
viduals, but the costs of secrecy and lack of accountability. Any balancing
test should impose some burden on the government to show not just a need
for the tools of surveillance, but a need to dispense with the forms of ju-
dicial review the Warrant Clause (or a reasonable facsimile in the case of
lesser intrusions) would impose.3 65 Focusing on procedural alternatives
rather than just the relative weight of the governmental and individual inter-
ests involved would provide a court with a more nuanced and appropriate
inquiry than the Hobson's Choice between liberty and security.366 This
would allow courts to do something other than replicate the legislative de-
bate about the balance between liberty and security.3
67
Finally, courts must take the Fourth Amendment seriously as provid-
ing an opportunity and an obligation for judicial constraint on discriminatory
as well as arbitrary searches and seizures. It is all too easy for "the people"
to give up a certain amount of privacy in exchange for security if it is only
someone else's privacy they are giving up.36i In relegating to the Equal Pro-
William Stuntz, evidently assuming that the kinds of tools the Patriot Act provides will
succeed in reducing the threat of terrorism, argues that the level of Fourth Amendment
protection should be calibrated according to the threat posed. See Stuntz, supra note 319,
at 2140-42.
363 See supra text accompanying notes 246-261.
364 See supra note 248.
365 The Keith Court surveyed and rejected the government's arguments that judicial re-
view will be too costly where national security is at stake. See supra note 303. The fear
that a judicial review requirement would prevent the government from conducting surveil-
lance seems overblown in light of the fact that the FISA court grants virtually all of the
government's requests. See supra note 159.
366 See Strossen, supra note 260, at 1194-1207 (critiquing general Fourth Amendment
balancing tests as structurally overvaluing the government's interests).
367 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 984-86 (1987) (describing the constitutional balancing process as replicating the
legislature's role).
368 See supra notes 323-324 and accompanying text.
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tection Clause questions about the discriminatory impact of law enforce-
ment conduct, the Court has unduly limited the ability of the Fourth
Amendment to serve as a countermajoritarian check369 and failed to rec-
ognize that political accountability has its blind spots.
C. Section 213 and Notice
Even though the nickname "sneak and peek" authority reveals a deep
antipathy on the part of the people to secret searches, this is one area in
which Fourth Amendment law is not hardened. In fact, the Supreme Court is
a latecomer to the issue of Fourth Amendment notice.370 In reviewing the
constitutionality of the authority this section affords, courts will need to
make the same choice of methodology described above. Will the Supreme
Court itself set a norm, will an originalist approach prevail, or will the Court
find some way to incorporate the apparent opinion of "the people" that
secret searches are unreasonable? What the courts should not do is
reflexively defer to whatever Congress decides.
V. CONCLUSION
The Patriot Act has generated strong reactions,371 even if those reac-
tions are sometimes based more on attitudes than on information about
its actual content. In this Article, I have discussed how some of the most
controversial surveillance provisions change previous law, what reactions
those provisions have provoked from the public and from Congress, and
what the courts are likely to say if and when they are directly confronted
with litigable challenges to the constitutionality of those provisions. The
discussion reveals that there is a serious gap between the kinds of con-
cerns raised by informed critics and the kinds of questions the courts will
ask in applying what has become submajoritarian Fourth Amendment law.
In my diagnosis and discussion of Fourth Amendment law, I have not
addressed arguments that the Fourth Amendment's provisions should not
apply to terrorism investigations in the same manner they apply to crime. 372
Even before September 11, the Fourth Amendment's procedural protec-
369 See ELY, supra note 321, at 172 (commenting on the difficulty of proving invidious
intent, as required for an equal protection claim, in individual cases).
370 See supra text accompanying notes 309-311.
3" The Bill of Rights Defense Committee movement, see supra text accompanying
notes 6-8, is a good example of what Larry Kramer describes as "popular constitutional-
ism." See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
372 One version of this argument is that Fourth Amendment standards should be vari-
able, and so the level of Fourth Amendment resistance to executive surveillance authority
should depend on the nature of the threat. See Stuntz, supra note 319. Another basis for argu-
ing that the usual Fourth Amendment rules do not apply is the President's inherent author-
ity under Article II, particularly in time of war.
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tions were weakened in the service of the war on drugs.37 3 It may well be
that both Congress and the courts will decide to further dilute the Fourth
Amendment, given the climate in which decisions about its constraints
are now being made. Since September 11, the Supreme Court has decided
thirteen of the fourteen Fourth Amendment cases it has heard in favor of
the government, 37 4 allowing some contested government investigations on
the theory that they do not even constitute a search or seizure,375 approving a
roadblock stop for investigatory purposes,37 6 and endorsing broad discre-
tion to stop, search, and arrest the occupants of vehicles.377 My concern is
that with respect to both the Patriot Act and the Fourth Amendment, the
baseline was located too far in the government's direction even before
September 11.
My argument in this Article does not address what results any chal-
lenges to the Patriot Act should yield, but instead focuses on the relative
roles of Congress and the Supreme Court in evaluating those challenges.
Members of the public and members of Congress should free themselves
of the assumption that the courts will scrutinize Congress's decisions about
the content of the Patriot Act, and also of the assumption that this or any
other legislation is satisfactory if it passes the very low threshold of Fourth
Amendment constitutionality set by the Supreme Court. And the Su-
preme Court should reconsider the sycophantic Fourth Amendment doc-
trine that does little more than defer to whatever decisions Congress makes,
even when the Fourth Amendment's "people" disagree, and even when a
minority of those people bear the brunt of those decisions.
The Court's ambivalence about whether to adhere to the Warren Court's
key decisions about how to interpret the Fourth Amendment-the preemi-
nence of the Warrant Clause with its strict probable cause requirement, in-
corporation, and reliance on the exclusionary rule to remedy violations-has
engendered disingenuous rulings that some government surveillance does
not fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment at all, and other
equally evasive maneuvers. The Court could forge an appropriate judicial
role by recognizing that the idea of antecedent judicial review can be one
"I See, e.g., David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness
and Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237 (1994).
371 Muehler v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005);
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542
U.S. 177 (2004); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); United States v. Flores-
Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S.
194 (2002); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112 (2001). The only exception to this one-sided series of rulings was Groh v. Rami-
rez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), where the Court found that execution of a search warrant requires
adequate notice of the scope of the search.
"I Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834; Drayton, 536 U.S. 194.376 Lidster, 540 U.S. 419.
377 Thornton, 541 U.S. 615; Pringle, 540 U.S. 366; Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266.
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aspect of an overarching reasonableness inquiry. If the Court allowed
itself flexibility to tailor appropriate judicial roles in reviewing various forms
of government surveillance, the Court could play an independent role in
considering the kinds of questions Congress addressed in its Patriot Act
renewal hearings-most often questions of what the judicial role should
be in overseeing executive branch surveillance authority. But in asking
questions about the reasonableness of government surveillance, the Court
should not simply substitute merely rhetorical balancing questions for
evasive decisions about what the Fourth Amendment does not cover.
There is no substitute for vigorous legislative oversight of the surveil-
lance authority created by the Patriot Act and other legislation. In today's
climate, however, the role of the courts should not be minimized as acutely
as it is under current Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld made a dramatic statement about the need for the
courts to play a role in curbing excessive executive discretion to detain
people in connection with the war on terror, despite its conclusion that Con-
gress had authorized the executive detention in question.379 With respect
to surveillance authority, Congress so far has shown an inclination to yield
considerable decision-making authority to the executive branch. Congress
can still leave room for the courts to play their historical role in reviewing
the executive branch's implementation of its surveillance authority before
surveillance takes place. If Congress does not do so, the Supreme Court
should dust off the citation to Marbury v. Madison3 8° one more time, re-
view its previous Fourth Amendment doctrine, and insist that the courts
play their part in deciding when the executive branch should not simply
be given a blank check.
378 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
179 See id. at 535-36 ("[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when it
comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organiza-
tions in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake." (internal citation omitted)).
305 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803).
